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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Daniel Wayne Rinn 
  
Master of Arts 
 
Department of History 
 
December 2012  
 
Title: John Dewey, the New Left, and the Politics of Contingency and Pluralism 
 
 Most histories of the New Left emphasize that some variant of Marxism 
ultimately influenced activists in their pursuit of social change.  Through careful 
examination of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), I argue that New Left thought 
was not always anti-liberal. Founding SDS members hardly rejected liberal political 
theory during the early years of the movement (1960-1963).  New Left thought was 
profoundly indebted to John Dewey’s political and philosophical method.  Deweyan 
liberalism suggested theory should be directly applicable in the world of social action and 
truth should always be regarded as contingent.  The connection between Dewey and SDS 
becomes apparent when one considers the role of Arnold S. Kaufman in the movement.  
Kaufman, a University of Michigan philosopher, applied Dewey’s political and 
philosophical method in his work as an activist and academic.  He coined the term 
“participatory democracy” for the New Left.  Consequently, this key New Left concept 
was itself grounded in Dewey’s philosophy.   
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
OF THE THEMES AND HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE NEW LEFT 
 
  
 The intellectual origins of New Left thought are diverse, reflecting a number of 
influences ranging from Marxism to existentialism as well as the circumstances of post-
war affluence and the Cold War.  Students For A Democratic Society (SDS) is indicative 
of this diversity.1  As a student organization, SDS drew on a number of ideas in and out 
of the classroom.  Radical professors, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Old Left all 
helped shape SDS’s thought and contribute to its diversity.  However, the movement 
begins to take more coherent form when it is considered within the historical 
circumstances of the Cold War.  The Cold War created a political culture that was closed 
to dissent.  American affluence and the nuclear bomb shaped domestic and foreign policy 
at a time when the United States was engaged in an ideological battle with the Soviet 
Union.  Anti-communism created an environment that impoverished the Old Left while, 
at the same time, suggested the American commitment to liberalism was a thin veneer 
that obscured a number of inequalities in the country.  Against this backdrop, SDS 
developed a political theory that would steer a course between liberalism and Marxism as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 There are several histories of the New Left that emphasize the different origins of SDS’s thought.  
Maurice Isserman draws a connection between the Old Left and the New Left through Michael Harrington, 
suggesting there is more continuity between the movements than most historians acknowledge.  Kirkpatrick 
Sale, John Patrick Diggins, Kevin Mattson, and James Miller offer analyses that suggest SDS drew from 
Marxism, existentialism, pragmatism, and liberalism at different points in its history.  Doug Rossinow has 
suggested the movement was also informed by Christian theology. 
2	  
	  
well as navigate other theoretical perspectives – existentialism and Christian theology for 
example – that individual members brought to the movement.   
John Dewey was a central figure in SDS’s thought, a connection that is often 
marginalized or missing in most historical works on the period.  In its early years, 
between 1960 and 1963, the student organization articulated a form of radical liberalism, 
one that was anchored in the political theory of Dewey.  However, all members of SDS 
were not Deweyan liberals and the organization did not consistently apply Dewey’s 
thought to contemporary affairs.  Acknowledging a Deweyan thread in SDS thought 
should actually highlight the intellectual diversity within the New Left.  Dewey’s 
experimental method, after all, would have been well suited to framing a theory that was 
flexible, providing ample room for dissent and dialogue.  Emphasizing this aspect of 
Dewey’s method and its appeal to the New Left also highlights the degree to which 
activists championed internal dissent.  For members of SDS, dissent was a crucial aspect 
of any democratic process, especially within an organization that sought to directly 
challenge the underlying assumptions of the Cold War in the United States.   
Another benefit in exploring Dewey’s influence within the New Left is that it 
brings a less-known theorist into clear focus.  Arnold Kaufman, a professor of philosophy 
at the University of Michigan, attended the Port Huron Convention in 1962 and directly 
influenced SDS’s conception of participatory democracy.  As a political theory, 
participatory democracy suggested that open dissent and discussion would not only yield 
the best policies, the processes of managing dissent would also enrich the lives of 
individual participants.  Kaufman adapted Dewey’s method and theory to his own 
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formulation of radicalism.  Both Dewey and Kaufman offered unique definitions of 
radicalism and liberalism that would appeal to the founding members of SDS.  
 
History and the New Left 
 Suggesting that SDS subscribed to a form of liberal doctrine in its early years 
does not necessarily conflict with the analyses of historians.  Authors such as John 
Patrick Diggins, Kevin Mattson, Robert Westbrook, and James Miller are examples of 
historians who note Dewey’s influence among members of SDS.  However, for different 
reasons each historian does not explore the connection between Dewey’s liberalism and 
SDS’s political thought in great detail.  Using Miller as an example, whose account of 
SDS’s intellectual background is very thorough, it is clear that this oversight is not 
always a comment about the degree to which Dewey was influential. 
 According to Miller, there was a tension in SDS’s thought between existentialism 
and pragmatism.  Activists sometimes believed that political action should help an 
individual in a quest for moral authenticity – an existentialist ideal.  At other times, 
SDS’s conception of participatory democracy emphasized dialogue and face-to-face 
relations along with Dewey’s understanding of democracy and human potential.  Greater 
participation would help create an active and educated public that was capable of using 
reason to address social problems – a chief goal of pragmatism.  As with most histories of 
the New Left, Miller’s analysis of SDS’s Marxist turn – most clearly exemplified by the 
Weatherman split in 1969 – weighs more heavily than the treatment of its liberal origins 
because activists became disillusioned with the politics of reform.  There are many 
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additional reasons for approaching the history of the New Left from a vantage point that 
highlights the movement’s anti-liberalism.   
The movement was complex, with a diverse population of activists, but it is clear 
that it became anti-liberal and opposed to working within the existing political system in 
the late sixties.  Much of the emerging radicalism came at a time when SDS became a 
central organization for the anti-war movement.  The violence in Vietnam and U.S. 
intensification of the conflict suggested to many activists that on-going war was an 
intrinsic element of capitalism and meaningful change could not be facilitated through 
democratic processes or peaceful demonstration and mass mobilization.  Political 
consensus among the nation’s top leaders proved that the U.S. was committed to the Cold 
War framework.  As SDS became disillusioned with the American political process, it 
began to question the underlying assumptions of liberalism and the co-optive nature of 
democratic reform.  Revolution, not liberal reform, took a more central role in SDS’s 
political theory.  Miller also suggests some members of SDS simply used the language of 
liberalism to conceal an underlying commitment to socialism or Marxism, a reading that 
has explanatory power considering the overall trajectory of the group. However, as his 
work shows, there is more to the story.2 
Along similar lines as Miller, Doug Rossinow has argued that some members of 
SDS were attempting to navigate Christian existentialism and Christian liberalism.  
Personal authenticity was linked to spirituality and a commitment to improving social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 James Miller’s, ‘Democracy is in the Streets:’ From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago (New York:  
Simon and Schuster, 1987), explores the diversity and tension in SDS’s thought, highlighting the role of 
Camus and, in some places, Dewey.  In an article on participatory democracy in The Encyclopedia of the 
American Left (Chicago:  UCP, 1990), he argued that for some members of SDS, the concept of 
participatory democracy allowed the organization to incorporate coded language about socialism into its 
platform – deliberately concealing a commitment to socialism for fear of anti-communist backlash.   
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relationships.  For Rossinow, “At this historical moment, these two intellectual and 
political frameworks worked well together; existentialism gave liberalism intellectual 
grounding, and liberalism helped to keep existentialism politically grounded.”3  However, 
outside of discussing the basic claims of liberalism – individual freedom of speech, 
thought, discussion, etc. – he does not explore the New Left’s conception of liberalism as 
a unique historical variation of the original doctrine of classical liberalism.  As with other 
histories of the period, the connection to Dewey is not explored, leaving the term 
‘liberalism’ a bit ambiguous and divorced from the factors that contributed to its 
historical development.  Departing from this trend in the historiogaphical terrain, Kevin 
Mattson has provided the most detailed account of the liberal origins of the New Left. 
According to Mattson, the early New Left was deeply embedded in a liberal 
tradition.  He argues that C. Wright Mills, W. A. Williams, Paul Goodman, and Arnold 
Kaufman provided the theoretical foundations for New Left thought.  John Dewey stood 
in the background of each of those authors to varying degrees.  However, while there are 
places where his analysis of Dewey’s influence is stronger – particularly in reference to 
Kaufman – this thread is not really explored.  His chapter on student publications 
examines the tension in SDS’s thought between radicalism and liberalism, arguing that in 
the end the two terms were not irreconcilable.  ‘Radical liberalism’ – a term Kaufman 
consistently used and Mattson adopts as a descriptor in his study – represented a juncture 
in New Left thought that combined the radical aims of social equality associated with 
Marxism with the doctrine of liberalism.  Kaufman and Goodman helped construct the 
bridge between these opposed ideas.      
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Doug Rossinow, “The Break-through to New Life,” taken from Daniel Pope ed., American Radicalism 
(Malden, Massachusetts:  Blackwell, 2001) 290. 
6	  
	  
Although Mattson pushes the analysis of liberalism and the New Left further than 
most historians, there is little discussion of the overall impact of pragmatism on political 
theory in the 1960s.   In many ways, his account exemplifies a broader trend in American 
intellectual history.  As Richard Bernstein has pointed out, many philosophers and 
historians have argued that pragmatism all but disappears from the American intellectual 
landscape by the 1930s.4  According to this interpretation, there was a “linguistic turn” in 
the United States due to the rising popularity of analytic philosophy in England as well as 
the arrival, in American universities, of logical positivists who fled Nazism in Europe.  If 
pragmatism persisted as an influential school of philosophy at all, it was only as a 
precursor to positivism.  Of this narrative, Bernstein remarks, “The classic American 
pragmatists were marginalized, relegated to the dustbin of history.”5  The linguistic turn, 
as an historical model, overlooks a number of ways in which pragmatism remained, and 
still does today, an influential philosophy in the United States.    
Pragmatism did not disappear from American political thought in the mid to late 
20th century.  By arguing that Dewey’s philosophy played an influential role in New Left 
thought, I am underscoring the fact that the broader tradition of pragmatism was not only 
alive and well in the 1960s, but it also had radical implications for the democratic theory 
of SDS.  The pragmatist’s general rejection of certainty and their willingness to subject 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For Bernstein’s description of this trend see his works, “The Resurgence of Pragmatism” published in 
Social Research (Winter 1992) and The Pragmatic Turn (2010).  See also Louis Menand’s The 
Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America (2001) for an example of an historical account that 
suggests pragmatism was eclipsed in the United States in the mid 20th century.  According to Menand, the 
Cold War, as an intense ideological conflict, created an atmosphere in the United States that was not 
receptive to pragmatism’s emphasis on contingency and pluralism.     
  
5	  Richard Bernstein, “The Resurgence of Pragmatism,” Social Research, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Winter 1992): 816.  
Bernstein’s larger project argues that pragmatism has remained an influential school of thought.  Citing 
Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam among others, he illustrates the ways in which classical pragmatists have 
influenced important theorists throughout the 20th century and in the present day.      
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every conclusion to endless testing is indicative of the importance they placed on 
communicative space and active participation in democratic processes.  Dewey’s 
description of a social and political order best suited to meet those needs would reappear 
decades later when SDS developed its own method for reinvigorating American 
democracy.   
 
Liberalisms, Radicalisms, and Method 
 Following Mattson, I will explore the non-Marxist theoretical origins of the New 
Left in order to contribute to the intellectual history of the period.  By looking back to the 
early twentieth century I hope to highlight John Dewey’s influence in the political theory 
of SDS – a connection some historians have made but have not adequately explored.  The 
concept of radical liberalism will figure prominently in my analysis of early SDS political 
theory.  Radical liberalism is a term most associated with Arnold Kaufman, whose work 
was often focused on redefining liberalism to meet the radical Marxist ends of social and 
economic justice.  Like Dewey, Kaufman was not an advocate for revolution; he thought 
liberalism actually aspired to its own radical ends of individual human development. 
 Dewey was responding to the doctrine of classical liberalism, which had its roots 
in Adam Smith and John Locke.  He argued that its emphasis on individual freedom and 
human potential was revolutionary because it supplanted centuries of political theory that 
centralized power in a monarch, or in the hands of a select few.  For Dewey, theories of 
the state had a tendency to become static, only serving the interests of an entrenched elite.  
Although classical liberalism had challenged injustice in the 18th century, it had become a 
form of dogma in the 19th and early 20th centuries.  Industrialization and growing 
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economic interdependence suggested an unyielding insistence on individual rights was 
not the best solution to emerging social problems such as marked class inequality.  
Instead of abandoning classical liberalism as Marxists had suggested, Dewey argued that 
the doctrine needed to be reinterpreted.  He attempted to reinvigorate the tradition by 
incorporating experimentalism, radical epistemology, pluralism, and contingency into its 
basic structure. 
 In chapter II, I explore Dewey’s method and the historical circumstances he was 
responding to.  Using James Kloppenberg’s analysis of pragmatism and social 
democracy, I situate Dewey within a variety of opposed political theories.  Kloppenberg 
has argued that Dewey was a member of a group of thinkers he termed the via media  – 
theorists who contested the claims of empiricism and laissez faire liberalism on one hand 
as well as German idealism and Marxism on the other.  I argue that Dewey proposed a 
radical political theory that was based in liberalism.  His radicalism grew out of a 
commitment to democracy, experimentalism, and contingency, not the rhetoric of 
revolution and Marxist ideology.  In addition to confronting the claims of classical 
liberals and Marxists, Dewey took a critical look at democratic realists, especially Walter 
Lippmann.  Growing inequality and an increasingly disengaged public posed problems 
for democratic theorists.  Instead of relegating decisions to an elite, as Lippmann 
suggested, Dewey argued that greater individual participation and experimentalism would 
be the best means for correcting social problems.  Using Dewey’s thought as a foundation 
for understanding a radical liberalism, I argue that his ideas influenced Arnold Kaufman 
and SDS. 
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 In chapter III, I describe Kaufman’s work on liberalism.  For Kaufman, and the 
New Left generally, the term liberalism denoted something different than it had for 
Dewey.  In referring to the New Left’s conception of liberalism, I will borrow from 
Mattson who uses the term “modern liberalism.”  Modern liberalism refers to the 
historical development of the regulatory state.  The New Deal in the United States 
represented the culmination of efforts to reform classical liberalism, shedding its 
emphasis on laissez faire.  Modern liberalism suggested some state regulation was 
necessary to protect economic as well as social interests.  Some security nets were needed 
to maintain a stable social order under a capitalist system.   
For the New Left, modern liberalism represented a co-opted revolution.  It only 
succeeded in marrying the interests of corporate and government elites while further 
disempowering the average American.  “Establishment liberalism” and “corporate 
liberalism” are terms that also appear in the New Left lexicon that refer to this narrative.  
The term anti-liberal refers to the New Left’s Marxist turn – for many activists the 
democratic process in the United States was corrupt.  The Democratic Party had a history 
of compromising and co-opting radical reform movements, a trend that was most clearly 
exemplified by resistance among southern Democrats to civil rights legislation.  For SDS, 
there was too much overlap between the Democratic and Republican parties.  However, 
the student organization did not articulate an anti-liberal political theory.  Along with 
Dewey and Kaufman, SDS believed liberalism had radical aims. 
 I argue that Kaufman offered a definition of “radical liberalism” as an alternative 
to Marxism and modern liberalism for the New Left.  The old aims of free choice and 
thought as well as a commitment to democracy were liberal ideals that should never be 
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abandoned.  Similar to Dewey, Kaufman found himself defending a form of liberalism 
against the Marxist left, democratic realists, and establishment liberals who resisted 
change to the status quo.  He developed a politics of contingency and pluralism that drew 
from Dewey’s radical epistemology and philosophical method.   
Kaufman’s liberal was radical because of the degree to which he or she stressed 
contingency.  While some theorists – Lippmann for example – could suggest they were 
pluralists because they described a fixed model of democracy that operated as a vehicle 
for organizing dissent in a civilized manner, Kaufman, like Dewey, gave new meaning to 
the term by denying the validity of fixed models of the state.  Kaufman rejected any 
theory that suggested democracy would always and everywhere take X form.  All 
doctrines were subject to revision.  As a result, he became the New Left’s most articulate 
proponent of participatory democracy – an idea that would appear consistently in SDS 
thought and was central to its founding manifesto, The Port Huron Statement.  For 
Kaufman, participatory democracy was a method, not a closed political theory.   Like his 
philosophical method, participatory democracy outlined a system for directing an 
experimental approach to practical as well as theoretical problems. 
 In chapter IV, I offer a close reading of three documents associated with the 
formative years of SDS.  Tom Hayden’s “Letter to the New (Young) Left” (1961), and 
SDS’s Port Huron Statement (1962) and American and the New Era (1963) all exemplify 
the influence of Kaufman and Dewey.  I argue that each of these documents drew heavily 
from Kaufman’s politics of contingency and pluralism and Dewey’s understanding of 
liberalism.  The purpose here is to highlight the thread of liberalism that connected SDS 
to Dewey and to place more weight on the other side of historical analyses that 
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emphasize anti-liberal tendencies within the New Left.  I am narrowing the scope of my 
argument to the founding elite within SDS.  It is not my intent to refute authors such as 
Diggins or Miller by suggesting that a small group within SDS was always staunchly 
liberal.  Instead, I would like to contribute to the body of literature that exists on this 
period by offering my own analysis of a specific moment and group within the 
movement.  
 
Of Historical Continuity 
 In suggesting that there is a tangible link from SDS to John Dewey, I am also 
attempting to draw attention to the similarities in the set of circumstances these theorists 
were responding to – both periods offered an excellent opportunity to challenge and 
revise the meaning of liberalism.  Dewey was responding to theorists who were 
attempting to understand the consequences of rapid industrialization and growth in the 
economy.  With economic expansion came greater inequality in the 19th century.  For 
Dewey, classical liberalism would have to be altered to compensate for changing 
circumstances.  Laissez faire would not always produce the greatest social good.  In 
addition to arguing with classical liberals, he challenged Marxists who wanted to 
abandon liberalism altogether.  Revolutionary thought was dogmatic and failed to 
acknowledge the potential for liberalism to create a just social order.  In the process of 
defining a liberalism that could navigate these opposed ideals, Dewey also engaged 
Walter Lippmann who proposed a conservative model of democracy and a limited theory 
of the state.   
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Likewise, members of the New Left confronted changed economic and social 
circumstances and developed a political theory that could navigate the claims of 
conservatives as well as Marxists.  Kaufman, Hayden, and SDS continued to fight Walter 
Lippmann’s ghost in the fifties and sixties.  Realism represented a direct threat to the 
participatory institutions that Kaufman and SDS championed.  Like Dewey, they 
suggested liberalism had hardened, becoming an inflexible political theory – a historical 
development that was exemplified by the American commitment to the Cold War.  
Growing affluence and increased consumption were juxtaposed with racism and poverty 
and militarism during a period when the U.S. was defending liberal institutions in an 
ideological conflict with the Soviet Union.  The Cold War framework was the most 
glaring example of the potential for any theoretical model to become dogmatic.  Like 
Dewey, the New Left found itself confronting Marxists, liberals, and realists in an 
attempt to define a radical political theory. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
OF DEWEY’S PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD AND POLITICAL THEORY:  
EXPERIMENTALISM, THE VIA MEDIA, AND RADICAL DEMOCRACY 
 
The end of democracy is a radical end.  For it is an end that has not  
been adequately realized in any country at any time. 
John Dewey (1937) 
 
 
 The connection between John Dewey (1859-1952), an American 
pragmatist who was critical of Marxists’ ideas and the politics of the New Left, a 
movement of American students often remembered for its violent end in the Weatherman 
bombings of the seventies, can be difficult to sketch.  Dewey disagreed with influential 
thinkers like Marx who suggested that certain forms of struggle and social tension are 
built into the historical process and are bound to culminate in a final, complete stage of 
history.  He was generally skeptical of any kind of deterministic theoretical model that 
was accepted as fixed and unalterable.  However, it was Dewey’s resistance to the 
language of revolutionary politics that made him a uniquely appealing thinker.  Quick to 
disregard arbitrary justifications for maintaining the status quo and the existing social 
order, yet willing to anticipate contemporary applications of previous social theories, 
Dewey’s historical perspective allowed him to observe periods of social and political 
turmoil with a well-informed understanding of how ideas evolve and subsequently impact 
action and the social environment.  His awareness of how revolutionary ideas could 
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become dogmatic and the source of new oppressive political regimes contributed to his 
own radicalism. 
     As a political theorist, Dewey encouraged the formulation of radical goals and 
stressed the importance of social, political, and economic reform.  Keenly aware of the 
deleterious nature of fixed beliefs and the resulting ignorance of specific historical 
circumstances, he did not advocate for immediate revolutionary change.  While he may 
have agreed with Marxists that there was a felt need to radically alter existing inequality, 
he envisioned a program of radical reform, not revolution.  Society would always be in 
need of reform, suggesting that revolution would not simply end all social problems 
making future change unnecessary.  Along similar lines, New Leftists such as Arnold 
Kaufman and Tom Hayden confronted a liberal intellectual tradition that had become 
dogmatic and, in fighting this impulse, sought a means for encouraging social reform that 
did not draw from inflexible theoretical models.  The revolutionary politics of the Old 
Left had ebbed, leaving behind, ironically, a strong anti-communist sentiment that would 
become a new support base for Cold War policies that had the potential to justify such 
extremes as McCarthyism.  Old Left intellectuals, Michael Harrington for example, 
became champions of an unbending anti-communism that limited theoretical discussion.  
The New Left searched for a political theory that would remain outside of the fixed 
perspectives offered by both Old Leftists and anti-communists. 
Founding members of SDS found in Dewey’s thought a method for navigating a 
variety of theoretical perspectives.  His emphasis on experimentalism, greater democratic 
participation, and incremental change unfolding on a radical, yet flexible, trajectory 
would appeal to dissenters who were uncomfortable with Old Left ideologies as well as 
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the pervasive cultural conformity that perpetuated social inequality and political 
acquiescence in an age of abundance.  Dewey’s philosophical method, experimentalism, 
emphasis on public participation in politics, and concern for social inequality, led him to 
formulate a political theory and framework for dissent that would appear in the work of 
Arnold Kaufman and SDS. 
SDS would revisit the annals of American intellectual history in one of its most 
significant contributions to New Left political theory, The Port Huron Statement (1962).  
According to James Miller, the conference at Port Huron, Michigan, where members of 
the student organization met to edit their manifesto, was a recasting of an important 
debate that took place much earlier in the twentieth century.  In the twenties and thirties, 
Dewey had debated Walter Lippmann on the role of democracy in an industrial age.  
Lippmann suggested the democratic ethos was misinformed and ignored the potential for 
mass irrationality to determine policy.  Dewey disagreed, suggesting that greater 
individual participation in the decision-making process would actually counter the 
potential for the development of a herd mentality in a democratic state.  The debate 
would have ramifications for New Leftists decades later.  According to Miller, “That the 
participants at Port Huron… wished to put something like Dewey’s hypothesis to the 
test—and thus refute Lippmann—seems clear enough.”  The debate with Lippmann 
allowed Dewey the opportunity to outline his own political theory, one that would 
resurface in the writings of leftists in the sixties.  Arnold Kaufman and SDS made direct 
references to realists such as Lippmann in their efforts to refute the idea that human 
nature was flawed and, thus, did not permit the existence of a stable form of participatory 
democracy. 
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Democracy and Crisis:  The Dewey-Lippmann Debate 
 In the early twentieth century John Dewey and Walter Lippmann debated the 
nature of democracy in America.  Dewey contested the conclusions of democratic realists 
who argued that members of the American public should not participate in the policy 
decisions that shaped their lives.  The country had just witnessed the horrors of the First 
World War, a conflict that deeply impacted American psychology and led to a loss of 
faith in humanity’s rational faculties.  For Lippmann, a noted journalist who, even 
according to his opponent, Dewey, provided, “the most effective indictment of 
democracy as currently conceived,”1 American politics was predicated on the illusive 
ideal of the democratic citizen, a member of the public who was capable of making 
rational and informed political decisions.  Lippmann argued, “if education cannot equip 
the citizen… if morality cannot direct him, first, because right or wrong in specific cases 
depends upon the perception of true or false, and, second, on the assumption that there is 
a universal moral code, which, in fact, does not exist, where else shall we look for the 
method of making the competent citizen?”2  The competent citizen did not exist.  
American democracy should limit public action to choosing between qualified experts 
who best understood the complexities of local, national, and international affairs.  
 By relegating individual citizens to a non-participative function in American 
politics, Lippmann was essentially refuting Dewey’s democratic ethos.  Dewey 
responded in his influential work, The Public and its Problems (1927), stating, “No 
government by experts in which the masses do not have the chance to inform the experts 
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1991) 294. 
 
2 Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public, (New York:  Macmillan, 1937) 35. 
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as to their needs can be anything but an oligarchy managed in the interests of the few… 
The world has suffered more from leaders and authorities than from the masses.”3  A 
specialist may be able to manage the technical affairs of government, but the purpose of 
any democratic form of political organization is to recognize and ameliorate the problems 
of the public.  For Dewey, the public and a government are not separate entities, 
consisting of different interests and motives that are sometimes antithetical.  A 
democratic representative is first and foremost a member of the public, not an expert who 
stands outside and above social needs.  Closing the gap between government and 
governed, he argued that citizenship necessarily required active involvement in politics 
and the formation of a participatory democracy.  Accordingly, “The essential need, in 
other words, is the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and 
persuasion.  That is the problem of the public.”4 
 The debate between Dewey and Lippmann would have repercussions for leftists 
in the sixties.  As proponents of participatory democracy, Kaufman and SDS continued 
the debate between the two theorists because Lippmann’s claims undermined any 
argument for greater participation.  Dewey’s response required him to articulate a 
concept of the public that was both inclusive, erasing what he saw as a fictitious division 
between the average citizen and the government, and capable of explaining how 
historical trends could actually encourage political apathy.  For the New Left, the concept 
of a “lost public”, which will be discussed in greater detail below, explained the 
circumstances in which the dispossessed and poor would succumb to political 
indifference, essentially becoming disenfranchised.  What is most notable about Dewey’s 
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4 Ibid. 
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response is that in many ways it represented a culmination of his philosophical ideas and 
methods.  The resulting political theory would prove quite attractive to a later generation 
that was trying to navigate an intellectual terrain rife with dissent and tension.  
 
Dewey’s Philosophical Method:  Philosophy and Social Action      
 As a pragmatist, social commentator, and political theorist, Dewey looked at 
philosophical debates through a variety of lenses.  His immediate focus on social needs 
and resistance to abstract speculation led him to argue that Western philosophical 
problems were largely the result of humanity’s need to find certainty in a world of varied 
and ever-changing appearances.  For Dewey, truth was a process, one that did not have an 
epistemic terminus that unveiled ultimate reality.  A search for truth that existed outside 
of human affairs – one that would be applicable regardless of historical or social context 
– dominated Western philosophy and led philosophers astray, preventing the tradition 
from focusing on relevant problems.  Flexibility, contingency, historicism, and 
experimentalism all defined Dewey’s philosophical method.  Not only would these 
themes also appear in his works on political theory, they would also be present in the 
work of Arnold Kaufman, Tom Hayden, and the founding documents of SDS.  Intent on 
making philosophy relevant to contemporary affairs, Dewey argued that philosophical 
inquiry needed to result in social action, a claim that had resonance for later generations 
of American leftists. 
 Dewey illustrated, in Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920), that Western 
philosophy had become irrelevant and was largely unable to respond to the problems that 
afflicted contemporary society.  He argued that the great Western philosophical systems 
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“were used to designate something taken to be fixed, immutable, and therefore out of 
time; that is eternal.  In being also something conceived to be universal or all-inclusive, 
this eternal being was taken to be above and beyond all variations in space."5  
Philosophers had focused on constructing coherent metaphysical systems that could 
establish a degree of certainty in a world of contingency and change.  The quest for 
certainty tended to divorce reason from experience.  Also, this type of speculation not 
only led to the formation of dogmatic beliefs – whether theological or metaphysical – but 
it also defined two types of mental labor:  a higher form of speculation found in 
philosophy and religion which stood in opposition to the second form, the consideration 
of everyday practical affairs.  Philosophy had been divorced from considerations of 
immediate social problems such as poverty.  
The higher form of speculation had historical roots in the “mytho-poetic” culture 
of ancient civilizations.6  Attempts to answer questions about the nature of the universe 
would appear in drama, stories, or theatrical portrayals of the world.  These stories would 
have to pass through two stages before they could develop into a form of philosophical 
speculation.  First, they would have to be “hardened into doctrines” – a form of 
consolidation that would often take place after political conquest.7  Second, a society 
would need to justify these belief systems on the basis of reason, not custom or tradition. 
As a result, philosophers would employ metaphysics, the field of philosophy that focuses 
on ultimate reality, to provide logical arguments to support beliefs that were originally 
held as a matter of custom.   
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6 Ibid., 7. 
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The emerging system of thought institutionalized a division between the two 
types of knowledge.  The skill of the artisan would remain outside and below the 
speculative practices of philosophers who were charged with answering questions about 
the underlying meaning of existence.  Dewey wrote, “Over against this absolute 
noumenal reality which could be apprehended only by the systematic discipline of 
philosophy itself stood the ordinary empirical, relatively real, phenomenal world of 
everyday experience.”8  This historical division of labor led to tension between the two 
fields of knowledge as a result of modern scientific discoveries.     
Although modern scientific method yielded immediate benefits, especially by way 
of industrialization, it had yet to be applied in its entirety to philosophical inquiry. The 
idealism of antiquity suggested that the universe was “an embodiment of a fixed and 
comprehensive Mind or Reason”.9  The new science suggested that the individual mind 
could shape nature and resituated the role of universal reason:  “Idealism ceased to be 
metaphysical and cosmic in order to become epistemological and personal.”10  The rise of 
scientific method did not fully extirpate idealism.  In the past, philosophers argued that a 
form of reason “had once and for all shaped nature and destiny.”11  The resulting 
metaphysical system suggested that all actions were shaped and governed by a set of 
universal laws.  Resisting this trend, modern scientific method granted the existence of 
universal reason, but suggested it was the product of the individual human mind.  
However, for Dewey, the needed philosophical reconstruction “esteems the individual not 
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as an exaggeratedly self-sufficient Ego which by some magic creates the world, but as the 
agent who is responsible through initiative, inventiveness and intelligently directed labor 
for re-creating the world, transforming it into an instrument and possession of 
intelligence.”12  The new approach to philosophy would have to recognize that reason 
was a tool for changing the world, not an epistemic anchor that unveiled an ordered 
universe.     
By stripping metaphysics from the definition of intelligence, Dewey emphasized 
that knowledge is always a process, not a fixed point at which the disciplined philosopher 
will eventually arrive.  He wrote, “Essential philosophic reconstruction… will regard 
intelligence not as the original shaper and final cause of things, but as the purposeful 
energetic re-shaper of those phases of nature and life that obstruct social well-being.”13  
The scientific revolution initiated much of the transition between the two types of 
knowledge:  
The world in which philosophers once put their trust was a closed world, a world 
consisting internally of a limited number of fixed forms, and having definite 
boundaries externally.  The world of modern science is an open world, a world 
varying indefinitely without the possibility of assignable limit in its internal 
make-up, a world stretching beyond any assignable bounds externally.14    
 
Reconstruction in philosophy would result in new attitudes about social action.  
Philosophers should acknowledge that the world could not be defined by fixed terms.  
Not only did such definitions lead inevitably to dogma, they also failed to account for the 
dynamic nature of the world.  Further, intelligence was a process that required an ongoing 
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application of experimental method, especially for problems that directly impacted the 
social good. 
 In the context of political theory, philosophical reconstruction would also require 
theorists to critically analyze abstract definitions of the state.  Many social philosophers 
had debated the role of the “individual” and “the state.”  Dewey summarized the 
perspectives of social theorists as: First, those that placed the individual above all; 
Second, those who argued the state was the final manifestation of individual meaning and 
will; Third, those that established an organic connection between the individual and the 
state.  All three of these broad traditions ignored particular circumstances by drawing 
heavily from historically meaningless concepts of the state and the individual.  Further, 
such speculation was difficult to ground in immediate problems:  “The social 
philosopher, dwelling in the region of his concepts, ‘solves’ problems by showing the 
relationship of ideas, instead of helping men solve problems in the concrete by supplying 
them hypotheses to be tested in projects of reform.”15  At best, this approach would only 
succeed in relating ideas to one another, making logical connections in an historical 
vacuum that ignored specific circumstances.   
 Pushing the emphasis on the primacy of historical circumstances still further, 
Dewey argued that “the self” only existed as a process, not having a specific 
developmental destination.  Similar to his discussion of truth, where he argued that the 
pursuit of knowledge did not end in a statement about reality that was always and 
everywhere applicable, he argued that a static understanding of the individual lacked any 
real explanatory power.  The self was always changing and could never be conceived of 
as being complete, especially in a world of constant flux.  In addition, the static 
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conception of the self suggested that real reform is an individual enterprise, consisting of 
introspection and internal moral improvement.  If society only functioned to protect the 
individual from external restraints, then it followed that social progress would be 
encouraged by individual uprightness, thus social problems were the result of individual 
moral defects. As a result, “social and economic passivity are encouraged… Individuals 
are led to concentrate in moral introspection upon their own vices and virtues, and to 
neglect the character of the environment.”16  By defining the self in fixed terms, theorists 
of all three of the above camps oversimplified the relationship between the individual and 
the state.  
 Along the lines of his treatment of truth and the self, Dewey also argued that the 
term “society” should be taken to denote a process.  Society was made up of associations 
that were multitudinous and had developed for “the better realization of any form of 
experience which is augmented and confirmed by being shared.”17  Instead of an end in 
itself, society was the process by which individuals formed associations, shared goods, 
and communicated ideas and experiences.  The interrelations necessary for these forms of 
social conduct actually created the individual.  According to Dewey, “the theory subjects 
every form of organization to continual scrutiny and criticism… it inquires what is done 
to release specific capacities and co-ordinate them into working powers.  What sort of 
individuals are created?”18  A process of inquiry and experimentalism would help correct 
social problems by identifying the best manner in which to organize individual capacities 
to produce a specific set of results.  Consequently, the social process created individuals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ibid., 196. 
 
17 Ibid., 205 
 
18 Ibid., 198. 
24	  
	  
by bringing them into cooperation for a shared goal.  The presence of innumerable shared 
goals meant that there would be an equally great number of various associations.  Here 
Dewey hinted toward the concept of pluralism he would develop in his work on political 
theory.  
 
The Via Media  
 As a pragmatist, Dewey’s approach to philosophy and the immediate problems of 
the public was both radical in nature and incremental in practice – it was a method for 
navigating opposed ideas.  As a result, his political orientation was quite complicated and 
hard to define, especially given the backdrop of Progressive Era reforms during the time 
he was most engaged as a public intellectual. According to Robert Westbrook, Dewey is 
exceptionally difficult to describe as a progressive because the term denotes a number of 
characterizations that Dewey would have rejected. 19  Although he was writing during the 
progressive era, his work mostly falls outside of progressive reform initiatives.  Dewey 
rejected centralized state control, middle class moral reform movements, and technocracy 
as elements of a top-down model that suggested the American public was a passive 
medium that could be shaped or influenced by reformers.  He emphasized greater 
democratization of scientific method and its general application to public affairs by 
members of the public, not experts.  Experimental reform implied direct participation and 
incrementalism over Marxist revolution as a strategy for social change.  Dewey was 
offering a philosophical basis and a political method that was radically different from 
Marxism and classical liberalism. 
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  James Kloppenberg has argued that many of these qualities grow out of a wider 
philosophical tradition he termed the via media.  Dewey was part of a broader but less 
known movement of thinkers who were attempting to chart a path between socialism and 
laissez-faire liberalism in politics as well as between empiricism and idealism in 
philosophy.20  Reconstruction in Philosophy exemplified this via media.  Dewey set out 
to define how practical and theoretical knowledge were set apart in the realm of 
philosophy – consciously suggesting that each one had both strengths and weaknesses – 
and illustrated how reconstruction can incorporate methods from each and apply them to 
immediate social problems.  The via media, as a methodological framework, could also 
be applied to political theory. 
Along the lines of his method in Reconstruction, Dewey examined how historical 
change can outpace development in human conceptual frameworks in Liberalism and 
Social Action (1930).  As a reflection of the via media, this work analyzed the evolution 
and contemporary applications of classical liberalism, a nineteenth century doctrine, 
which still influenced the public mind and government policy in the early twentieth 
century.  Dewey’s liberalism would be appealing to early New Left theorists because, as 
a method for navigating antithetical beliefs, it provided a flexible model for directing 
social change.  Dewey wrote, “I have wanted to find out whether it is possible for a 
person to continue, honestly and intelligently, to be a liberal, and if the answer be in the 
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affirmative, what kind of liberal faith should be asserted today.”21  His aim was to 
examine liberalism without “abandoning in panic things of enduring value.”22   
Classical liberalism was concerned with the need to protect individuals from 
unnecessary governmental constraints.  The goal was to balance the role of government, 
which provided certain liberties while denying others, with the individual’s right to 
pursue their personal interests.  However, “The economic and political changes for which 
they strove were so largely accomplished that they had become in turn the vested 
interest.”23  The doctrine of laissez-faire, which was at one period radical, had become a 
fixed truth, a concept that resisted change and provided the “intellectual justification of 
the status quo.”24  By reifying the concept of natural rights, laissez-faire liberalism 
institutionalized a form of individualism that resisted social reform.   
The role of historical perspective was crucial for Dewey.  While he did not want 
to suggest that classical liberals were solely responsible for creating an element of 
inflexibility in society, he argued that their failure to understand “the historic relativity of 
their own interpretation of liberty,” their doctrines were reminiscent of “political 
absolutism.”25  Early liberals equated economic liberty with increased productive 
capacities, abundance, and an overall increase in material wealth.  However, for Dewey 
the belief that economic liberty would necessarily ensure the social good seemed to be 
misinformed:  “The only form of enduring social organization that is now possible is one 
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in which the new forces of productivity are cooperatively controlled and used in the 
interest of the effective liberty and the cultural development of the individuals that 
constitute society.”26  Liberals had succeeded in unleashing unprecedented productive 
capabilities by overturning mercantilism.  However, the emphasis on individualism and 
deregulation that made that feat possible now encouraged a dogmatic view of social 
progress.  For Dewey, it was necessary to critically reexamine individualism, trying to 
understand how it leads to social inequality.       
Although Dewey identified problems with the conservative aspects of liberalism 
once it became institutionalized in government policies, he did not want to scrap the 
entire enterprise.  He was chiefly concerned with what he identified as a tendency toward 
apologetics in the face of some of the detrimental effects of a liberal regime.  While 
liberalism possessed undeniably useful concepts – for example, Dewey wrote “Grateful 
recognition is due early liberals for their valiant battle in behalf of freedom of thought, 
conscience, expression and communication.”27 – Once reified, liberalism would justify 
disparity of wealth as opposed to offering a strategy for social change.28  
Institutionalization, not liberalism itself, created problems in society.  Laissez faire, as an 
entrenched economic model, made it difficult to combat corporate greed by preventing 
the state from exercising regulatory powers.  However, as an idea that navigated a 
tumultuous period of industrialization in the past, liberalism could provide a model for 
the twentieth century, “Liberalism is committed to an end that is at once enduring and 
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flexible: the liberation of individuals so that realization of their capacities may be the law 
of their life.”29   
For Dewey, the older liberalism of an era of scarcity had to be reformulated in an 
age of abundance.  Industry changed considerably, “while changes in the institutions in 
thought and belief have taken place to the least extent.”30  In an earlier work, 
Individualism Old and New (1930), he made similar suggestions about the transition to 
the modern industrial age.  He argued,  “As far as individuality is associated with 
aristocracy of the historic type, the extension of the machine age will presumably be 
hostile to individuality in its traditional sense… The problem of constructing a new 
individuality consonant with the objective conditions under which we live is the deepest 
problem of our times.”31  The transition from a pre-industrial to an industrial based 
economy, which created glaring class inequality, required the formulation of new 
concepts.   
Liberalism could make sense of a new historical period without abandoning old 
concepts, without an immediate revolution, whether intellectual or political.  A new 
conceptual model would have to manage a state of affairs defined by constant flux.  “Flux 
does not have to be created.  But it does have to be directed.”32  Coming back to 
Reconstruction, where he argued that truth and knowledge are processes that do not end 
in the establishment of a coherent metaphysical system, but, rather, point toward the 
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30 Ibid., 63 
31 John Dewey, Individualism Old and New, (New York:  Prometheus, 1930) 16. 
32 Op. cit., Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, 61. 
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transitory qualities of the world, Dewey suggested that social change would always be a 
necessity.   
Fixed concepts would always become outdated, creating tension in society.  In the 
past, philosophers had developed complex metaphysical systems to abate tensions in 
transitional periods.  For example, Dewey took issue with classical liberalism’s tendency 
to reduce the individual to an isolated, autonomous being that existed outside of social 
relationships.  To counter this trend, he presented a model that was neither conservative 
nor radical as the terms are typically defined for managing rapid change.  While he 
advocated a form of radical change, it was incremental in form and was not terminal.  
However, social action could be difficult to direct or facilitate in the modern world where 
complex interdependencies obscured the source of a given problem.  Dewey extended his 
method of inquiry to this issue in his response to Lippmann, who accepted Dewey’s 
propositions about the inherent complexity of the modern world, but arrived at very 
different conclusions. 
 
The Problem of a Lost Public:  Human Potential and Experimentalism 
In the vein of his other works, which stressed historicism and experimentalism, 
The Public and its Problems (1927) analyzed how fixed models of the state led to 
inflexibility and social injustice.  Democratic realists such as Lippmann developed static 
conceptions of the state – models that would be applicable regardless of circumstantial 
variation – a trend that was not without historical precedent.  For Dewey, “The idea that 
there is a model pattern which makes a state a good or true state has affected practice as 
well as theory.  It, more than anything else, is responsible for the effort to form 
30	  
	  
constitutions offhand and impose them ready-made on peoples.”33  There is an implicit 
critique of classical liberalism in this argument.  As noted in Liberalism and Social 
Action as well as Individualism Old and New, an uncompromising individualism should 
not define the nation’s political culture.  Along similar lines, Dewey had also cast a 
critical light on theories of the state that were modeled on progressive evolution.  
“Growth signified an evolution through regular stages to a predetermined end because of 
some intrinsic nisus or principle.  This theory discouraged recourse to the only method by 
which alterations of political forms might be directed:  namely, the use of intelligence to 
judge consequences.”34  The form of historical determinism outlined by thinkers such as 
Hegel and Marx forced social action into an unbending model that was anchored to an 
unalterable goal.  
Both of the above conceptions of the state precluded experimentalism because 
they followed predetermined models of development. “The person who holds the doctrine 
of ‘individualism’ or ‘collectivism’ has his program determined for him in advance.  It is 
not with him a matter of finding out the particular thing which needs to be done and the 
best way, under the circumstances, of doing it.”35  Similar to the fixed conceptual 
frameworks Dewey rejected in philosophy, closed theoretical models of the state would 
prevent social action.  Further, the above use of “individualism” and “collectivism” as 
examples of closed models comes back to the via media in the sense that they represented 
artificial divisions in an inflexible theoretical framework.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Op. cit., Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, 45. 
 
34 Ibid. 
 
35 Ibid., 202. 
31	  
	  
Like members of SDS years later, Dewey was attempting to steer a course 
between competing models of the state and social action.  On the one hand, liberalism 
unleashed powerful economic and democratic forces; however, the concept, as strictly 
defined, would fail to correct the injurious results of economic inequality.  On the other 
hand, there was the solution offered by revolutionary socialists, but theorists in this camp 
adhered to a view of historical progress that was just as uncompromising as classical 
theories.  For Dewey, a reinvigorated democratic theory would have to focus on social 
justice amid constantly changing and unpredictable conditions without abandoning the 
progressive elements of liberalism that encouraged education, freedom of expression and 
thought, and democratic government. 
As his debate with Lippmann indicated, Dewey envisioned a democratic society 
where citizens were political actors, not passive observers.  While liberalism successfully 
wrested power from an entrenched aristocracy, the doctrine never fully completed its 
course toward releasing the potential of every individual in society.  The new social order 
simply replaced one set of vested interests with another, and older forms of inequality 
transformed but did not disappear.  Dewey wrote, “The same forces which have brought 
about the forms of democratic government, general suffrage, executives and legislators 
chosen by majority vote, have also brought about conditions which halt the social and 
humane ideals that demand the utilization of government as the genuine instrumentality 
of an inclusive and fraternally associated public.”36  Individualism, as an unquestionable 
doctrine, narrowed the scope of permissible public involvement in matters of social 
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concern.   In order to realize the promises of liberalism in an age of interdependence 
would require greater public involvement in politics as well as fraternal cooperation.   
The problem of the public, according to Dewey, was that society in the modern 
industrial era had become too large and polymorphous.  The public was lost amid a 
variety of associations, some local and some national.  He wrote, “It is not that there is no 
public, no large body of persons having a common interest in the consequences of social 
transactions.  There is too much public, a public too diffused and scattered and too 
intricate in composition.”37  In the past, a group of individuals formed a public when they 
were confronted with the indirect consequences of the actions of others.  For example, 
Dewey maintained that a duel agreed on by two individuals who willingly subject 
themselves to the risk of death or injury would not warrant public intervention.  As a 
private agreement where the consequences are contained between the principal actors, it 
would not affect others.  However, a blood feud between two families, where violence 
would be less contained, would represent a public problem.  The indirect consequences of 
the feud would be much harder to control, where violence might erupt chaotically, 
involving a large number of people, having repercussions in the economy, legal system, 
etc., which would prove to be quite disruptive.   
The United States in the twentieth century was simply too large for indirect 
consequences to be perceived, allowing individuals the ability to detect their point of 
origin.  For Dewey, “An inchoate public is capable of organization only when indirect 
consequences are perceived, and when it is possible to project agencies which order their 
occurrence.  At present, many consequences are felt rather than perceived; they are 
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suffered, but they cannot be said to be known”.38  The U.S. was a “great society,” 
consisting of multiple publics and associations that did not necessarily have a common 
denominator.  Similar to his conclusions in Individualism Old and New, Dewey argued in 
The Public and Its Problems that historical circumstances had changed drastically while 
conceptual frameworks failed to keep pace:  “Conditions have changed, but every aspect 
of life, from religion and education to property and trade, shows that nothing approaching 
a transformation has taken place in ideas and ideals.”39  The great society did not foster a 
sense of shared goals or community among citizens of the United States. 
The problem of too many publics could only be resolved by the formation of a 
“great community.”  Dewey argued, “Unless communal life can be restored, the public 
cannot adequately resolve its most urgent problem:  to find and identify itself.  But if it be 
reestablished, it will manifest a fullness, variety and freedom of possession and 
enjoyment of meanings and goods unknown in the contiguous associations of the past.”40  
Dewey’s debate with Lippmann encouraged him to articulate exactly how and why the 
majority of Americans had become detached from the political process.  He agreed with 
Lippmann that propaganda and disinformation, the distractions of everyday life, and the 
existence of an overwhelming number of technical problems that affected the nation 
made it difficult for a public to exercise any political agency.  Departing from 
Lippmann’s logic, he argued that the above circumstances made it more important than 
ever to encourage active public participation in governmental affairs.   
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Only active participation could counter the problem of an uninformed, detached 
public. Of methods Dewey wrote, “They will be experimental in the sense that they will 
be entertained subject to constant and well-equipped observation of the consequences 
they entail when acted upon, and subject to ready and flexible revision in the light of 
observed consequences.”41  As with Kaufman and SDS later, the role of experimentalism, 
close observation of results, and truth testing would play a central role in defining 
problems and their solutions.  The great community would consist of conscious, critical 
individuals who shared in a collective responsibility to always analyze, discuss, and 
modify policy.  Participatory democracy would be a prerequisite for the formation of 
such a critical public.   
 
Conclusion:  Radical Democracy as a Way of Life 
  The theory of democracy that emerged out of Dewey’s political philosophy 
stressed social interaction and individual potential alongside contingency and constantly 
changing conditions.  A democratic state required the interaction of publics that 
constantly analyzed social, political, and economic problems.  Political theorists should 
never construct fixed models of the state that disregarded immediate experiences and 
results.  Dewey’s model democracy was radical because it emphasized social action, 
debate, individual participation, and experimentalism.  Further, democracy was more than 
a theory of social and political organization; it was a way of life, a process that unfolded 
as individuals subjected claims about the world to constant scrutiny.  In “Creative 
Democracy:  The Task Before Us” (1939), Dewey argued that democracy was itself a 
process:  
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Democracy as compared with other ways of life is the sole way of living which 
believes wholeheartedly in the process of experience as end and as means; as that 
which is capable of generating the science which is the sole dependable authority 
for the direction of further experience and which releases emotions, needs and 
desires so as to call into being the things that have not existed in the past.42      
 
Dewey’s radicalism grew out of his commitment to social action and open discourse.  He 
argued that immediate experience, not closed theoretical models, should direct action.  A 
pluralist society would encourage individual initiative, thus releasing individual potential 
in social action.   
 The pluralism he affirmed would appear decades later in the work of Arnold 
Kaufman, a philosopher who taught at the University of Michigan during the years Tom 
Hayden and SDS would frame The Port Huron Statement.  His work was an early 
indicator of the emerging New Left thought that criticized the Cold War, establishment 
liberalism, and fixed theoretical models.  For Kaufman, political theory only served a 
directive purpose; it should never define the state in fixed terms.  Like Dewey he argued 
that increased participation in the political process would help educate individuals as well 
discourage apathy.  Participatory democracy, a term he coined and would appear 
frequently in New Left thought, would function as a method – not a closed theory – that 
would direct experimental reform efforts.  As the next chapter will suggest, Kaufman’s 
relationship with SDS would become tense, but in the early sixties many of his ideas 
were adopted by the student organization.
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published 1939.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
OF ARNOLD KAUFMAN:  RADICAL LIBERALISM, PARTICIPATORY 
DEMOCRACY, AND A PHILOSOPHY FOR THE NEW LEFT 
 
[T]he liberal tradition possesses moral and intellectual resources richer than those 
 of any competing tradition.  The Right fails to acknowledge this because it rejects or 
distorts that tradition; the Left fails because, in its passion for a new revolutionary 
rhetoric, it blinds itself to the radical implications of liberalism’s  
very old aims and principles. 
 
The central claim of John Dewey’s philosophy was that the democratic process could 
enrich the lives of men not only by what it does for them but by what it does to them. 
     Arnold Saul Kaufman (1968) 
 
 
 Arnold Saul Kaufman’s philosophy had a direct impact on the framers of The 
Port Huron Statement.  His thought served as a bridge between John Dewey and the 
founding members of SDS.  Unfortunately, Kaufman appears infrequently and usually 
commands little attention in most historical accounts of the New Left.   Too often his 
thought is overshadowed by the work of writers such as Marcuse and Mills, whose 
revolutionary rhetoric captured the attention of young radicals in the sixties.  However, as 
an indication of Kaufman’s influence and the degree to which he was involved with SDS 
and the New Left generally, it is necessary to recognize his hand in formulating and 
giving definite shape to the concept of “participatory democracy,” a phrase that has 
become synonymous with SDS.  Like Dewey, who argued that theory should function as 
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a method for solving specific social problems, Kaufman’s understanding of participatory 
institutions reflected his commitment to experience and method over theory as well as 
contingency and pluralism over dogma.     
Participatory democracy should not be included in the history of the New Left as 
an example of the empty phraseology and ambiguous theoretical perspectives that were 
associated with the movement.1   Kaufman applied Dewey’s radical epistemology, 
experimentalism, and democratic theory to his own ideas about greater participation.  The 
concept of participatory democracy grows out of a rich and radical liberal tradition that 
had its earliest advocate in Dewey.  Kaufman revisited Dewey’s work in the fifties and 
sixties as he formulated his own political theory – one that would emphasize human 
potential for rational thought and action.  He was concerned with radically reconstructing 
a political culture that had become bankrupt when Cold War consensus and anti-
communism obstructed open debate and political dialogue. 
 An analysis of Kaufman’s thought and influence among early SDS members has a 
number of advantages.  First, it can clearly establish a link between John Dewey’s 
liberalism and the New Left’s political thought.  Second, and directly related to the first, 
it lends credibility to the argument that New Left thought was indebted to a form of 
radical liberalism, a point that is neglected in histories of the period that emphasize the 
movement’s radical turn.  SDS members found in the work of Dewey and Kaufman a 
theoretical model and philosophical method that could navigate extremes, while still 
offering radical goals and denying dogmatic appeals to fixed theoretical perspectives in 
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has roots in the criticism of the New Left by intellectuals such as Irving Howe, Paul Goodman, Michael 
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Patrick Diggins and Christopher Lasch are both examples of historians who arrive at these conclusions in 
their work. 
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pursuit of political and social change.  Last, and possibly most important, such an 
analysis brings the concept of participatory democracy into a brighter light.   
Kaufman drew four important elements from Dewey’s liberalism in defining 
participatory democracy.   The concept was embedded with an emphasis on 
experimentalism, open dialogue, truth-testing, and the power of social and political action 
to encourage human development.  An examination of these characteristics can bring 
deeper meaning to one of SDS’s most important contributions to American political 
thought, the concept of participatory democracy.  While Dewey and Kaufman gave 
definition to the idea, it was SDS that is most remembered for attempting to put it into 
practice.  In order to establish the connection between Dewey, Kaufman, and SDS it is 
necessary to develop and analyze Kaufman’s broad philosophical and political method, as 
well as provide a detailed account of his definitions of radical liberalism and participatory 
democracy. As a method, Kaufman’s political and philosophical thought closely mirrors 
that of Dewey, whose unique historical perspective provided a model for rejecting 
dogmatically opposed extremes while exploring a reinvigorated form of liberalism.   
Kaufman’s political theory is marked by an emphasis on instrumentalism, or the 
idea that theory should serve a practical function, and experimentalism, which suggested 
that all conclusions are tentative and subject to change based on experience.  Moving 
beyond method generally, it is also evident that his work on participatory democracy and 
radical liberalism was influenced by Dewey, and, in turn, are reflected in SDS’s political 
theory.   
For Kaufman, radicalism meant acknowledging pluralism and contingency when 
attempting to solve deep-rooted social problems.  He shared similar goals – distributive 
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justice for example – with other radicals, but it was his method that distinguished him.  
Participatory democracy was the political manifestation of his philosophical method.  
Participatory institutions would augment the traditional representative state by 
incorporating the voices of average Americans.  The emphasis on individual participation 
then shaped his definition of radical liberalism.  Kaufman agreed with Dewey, and 
suggested liberalism was in need of a new definition of freedom – freedom from restraint 
was no longer a sufficient liberal goal in the modern capitalist world.  
 
Political and Philosophical Method:  Experimentalism and Instrumentalism 
 Along the lines of Dewey in the early twentieth century, Kaufman’s intellectual 
work was motivated by a desire to navigate opposed political theories in an attempt to 
develop a body of thought that would be useful for understanding the historical nature of 
contemporary problems.  Dewey was critical of the New Deal, American Communists, 
and the right in their respective responses to the Great Depression.  He sought to 
reinvigorate the liberal tradition in a way that stressed interdependence, personal growth, 
social and economic equality, and democratic participation – all of which he felt were 
ignored or overlooked by other theorists.  Instead of abandoning classical liberalism in its 
entirety as Marxists had done, he formulated a unique and radical liberalism that did not 
celebrate individualism to such extremes that ignored social calamity.   
Similarly, Kaufman confronted an intellectual terrain that was defined by 
extremes.  His work focused on the shortcomings of the Welfare State, criticized 
corporate liberalism2, and found little value in Marxism.  He also rejected the fervent 
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Welfare State was perceived by American leftists.  Classical liberalism, with its emphasis on laissez-faire 
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anti-communism that had come to define American political culture during the Cold War.  
Each of these elements indicated the existence of unquestioned beliefs in the United 
States.  Marxism was too dogmatic in its reading of history and its prescription for 
revolutionary social change.  Likewise, the Welfare State, corporate liberalism, and anti-
communism were uncompromising concepts – founded upon an unflinching commitment 
to the basic assumptions of laissez-faire economic and political theory.  
For Kaufman, corporate liberalism and the Welfare State were thinly veiled 
variations of classical liberal doctrine.  The regulatory measures and safety nets that 
existed as a result of the New Deal were piecemeal reforms that did not radically 
challenge existing ideas about social and economic justice – in fact, they symbolized the 
degree to which classical liberalism had become an unquestioned creed in the United 
States.  Marxism, on the other hand, was too inflexible in its repudiation of liberalism.  
As a result of the incompatibility of these traditions, Kaufman’s philosophical method 
tended to resist dogmatic models and inflexible beliefs or conclusions.  Like Dewey, he 
regarded all truths as subject to change in response to the test of social experience.    
Kaufman accepted contingency and pluralism during a period in U.S. history 
when most intellectuals were choosing sides in the battle of ideas that underpinned the 
Cold War.  His philosophical method closely resembled the via media as Kloppenberg 
described it in his analysis of the American pragmatists.  Whereas Dewey was attempting 
to give shape to ideas that fell outside or in between German idealism and British 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
economics, had been overturned by New Deal liberalism, which stressed the role of the state in regulating 
the economy.  For the New Left, programs such as the Great Society, which grew out of New Deal 
liberalism, were evidence of the co-optive nature of the Welfare State.  Piecemeal concessions were made 
to the working poor without actually including them in the processes for determining policy.  This form of 
liberalism protected corporate interests by building a political establishment that resisted fundamental 
change.  Accordingly, the New Deal was considered a failed attempt to create a truly radical liberalism.  In 
the sixties, this critique carried over to include Johnson era reforms.   See Kevin Mattson’s Intellectuals In 
Action (2002) for a discussion of these terms. 
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empiricism as well as Marxism and classical liberalism, Kaufman was concerned with the 
New Left’s growing reliance on Marxist thought as well as the cold war consensus that 
seemed to unite the Democratic Party with conservative elements in American politics.3   
As a via media, his thought confronted the claims of radicals, liberals, and conservatives.  
Both liberal and conservative forms of anti-communism as well as the growing militancy 
among leftists posed challenges to an open-ended and experimental method for social 
change.  
The essay, “The Nature and Function of Political Theory” (1954), which appeared 
in The Journal of Philosophy, is a useful example of Kaufman’s experimentalism and 
pluralism.  By examining and defending the underlying ideas about the utility of liberal 
reform, this work is also a helpful place to start in tracing Dewey’s influence among early 
sixties radicals.  Further, the general model for directing political change he outlined 
appeared as an underlying framework in both Hayden’s “Letter to the New (Young) Left” 
and The Port Huron Statement.  For Kaufman, incremental steps, with directive purpose, 
would lead to radical change.  By providing a working model for change, “The Nature 
and Function of Political Theory” can be viewed as a prototypical New Left strategy for 
approaching the problems that would later be outlined by SDS.   
For Kaufman, a political theory should function as a method for understanding 
social change.  It should not propose final solutions to philosophical questions about the 
good state.  Rather than serving as “rhetoric,” or justifying an “existing power structure,” 
Kaufman began by asserting, “Political theory should be a guide to action.”4  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Kaufman’s concern that the movement had become too radical and violent toward the end of the sixties 
appears most forcibly in his work, The Radical Liberal (1968), which is discussed in greater detail below. 
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political philosopher should help policy makers develop strategies for correcting specific 
problems.  Political theory should not be a realm of philosophical debate that is detached 
from the needs of society.  Like Dewey, who suggested that fixed models of the state 
perpetuated inflexible political regimes because they failed to take account of the 
historical nature of a problem, Kaufman emphasized the importance of contingency – all 
conclusions should be treated as provisional. Theory, Kaufman stated, should be 
developed to serve an “instrumental function.”5   
Although he emphasized the direct application of political philosophy, Kaufman 
also argued that “ultimate ideals” could serve a rhetorical role in political theorizing.  
“They are the keystone of an indispensable rhetoric; they serve a directive function; they 
constitute an ultimate evaluative principle.”6  By serving as a theoretical final goal, an 
ideal such as economic equality could provide a strategic and practical framework for 
understanding how and if a particular policy was making progress.  Even more 
importantly: 
For most men who are impelled to action by appeals made in terms of ultimate 
ideals, the expressions are, in their primary political contexts, vague and 
ambiguous; but, because there is an accretion of private, personally significant 
meanings in the case of each individual, they play an indispensable rhetorical role.  
Indispensable because political theorizing is sterile word-play unless there is some 
way of arousing and rearousing adherents.7    
 
Here Kaufman offered a glimpse of what would become a problem for the New Left in 
the following decade.  Ultimate ideals were useful for determining and evaluating policy, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Arnold S. Kaufman, “The Nature and Function of Political Theory,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 5I, 
No. 1 (January, 1954): 5. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 6. 
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and they were also necessary for garnering support for a particular cause.  However, as he 
would later lament,8 an ultimate ideal could also “be perverted by demagogic ranting.”9  
However, these ideals were to be closely understood in relation to their resulting social 
effects.  “It is precisely this attention to consequences that lies at the heart of 
instrumentalism.”10  Similar to Dewey, Kaufman articulated a need to develop a 
conceptual model that focused on directing change without devolving into a form of 
absolutism.  Incremental steps would eventually lead to radical change without the social 
tumult of revolution.  Along these lines, he formulated additional evaluative principles. 
 Another important method for assessing policy required the theorist to establish 
more immediate goals, or what Kaufman called “intermediate ideals.”11  While an 
ultimate goal could be understood in terms of statistical evidence—for example, 
economic equality could be measured by statistical analyses of American incomes—
intermediate ideals would require somewhat exhausting empirical testing.12  By 
highlighting the operational aspects of goals and definitions, Kaufman employed an 
experimental approach that stressed the importance of revisability and the need to justify 
theories on the basis of observed results.  He suggested of intermediate ideals, “Despite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In The Radical Liberal (1968) and “Participatory Democracy Ten Years Later” (1969) Kaufman viewed 
the increasing radicalism in SDS and the student movement critically, regarding their demands for 
“participatory democracy” somewhat misguided and contradictory given their growing propensity toward 
violence.  This will be discussed below in connection to the relationship between Kaufman and SDS. 
9 Op. cit, Arnold S. Kaufman, The Nature and Function of Political Theory, 6. 
10 Ibid., 6. 
11 Ibid., 11. 
12 Ibid. 
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the tentativeness with which they should be held, they must be employed as policy guides 
because the alternative is haphazard reliance on hunch, hope, and harangue.”13   
Intermediate ideals had a directive purpose.  They should be revisable to 
accommodate unanticipated outcomes or changing circumstances.  Dewey outlined a 
similar program in Individualism Old and New (1930), where he wrote:   
To accept them [current conditions] intellectually is to perceive that they are in 
flux.  Their movement is not destined to a single end.  Many outcomes may be 
projected, and the movement may be directed by many courses to many chosen 
goals… By becoming conscious of their movements and by active participation in 
their currents, we may guide them to some preferred possibility.14   
 
Dewey was specifically concerned with directing the development of a new way to 
conceptualize individualism.  The method he outlined surfaced in Kaufman’s essay on 
the function of political theory.  Dewey argued, “The scientific attitude is experimental as 
well as intrinsically communicative.  If it were generally applied, it would liberate us 
from the heavy burden imposed by dogmas and external standards.”15  Kaufman argued 
that such a method was necessary for guiding political theory. 
The focus on both ultimate and intermediate ideals allowed Kaufman to present a 
model for social and political change that was pragmatic, historically focused, and yet 
capable of envisioning policy beyond immediate social realities.  Also, by focusing on 
consequences and empirical testing, he echoed Dewey’s call for a “general adoption of 
the scientific attitude in human affairs”.16  Theory should address immediate concerns 
that are relative to the given historical period as well as provide an ambitious goal that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ibid. 
14 John Dewey, Individualism Old and New, (New York:  Prometheus, 1930) 72. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 75. 
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could be reached, through a practice of rigorous testing, in the somewhat far removed 
future.  For Kaufman, the process of radical change would take time and was not 
necessarily terminal.  Reminiscent of Dewey, he wrote, “Reform and reconstruction are 
probably permanent needs of any society.”17 
“The Nature and Function of Political Theory” served as a skeletal model for 
Kaufman’s beliefs about radical change.  It is in the background of Hayden’s “Letter to 
the New (Young) Left” (1961) as well as The Port Huron Statement (1962).  By 
acknowledging contingency and the resulting importance of pluralism, the essay also 
hinted at Kaufman’s brand of radical liberalism, a tradition that endorsed permanent 
political and social change but resisted violent revolution.  His work would continue to 
evolve as his relationship with the New Left began to turn sour.  As SDS became 
increasingly resistant to working within established political avenues, Kaufman 
responded critically by outlining the merits of a sincere radical liberalism.  Like Dewey, 
the tradition Kaufman had in mind served as a via media.  His brand of radicalism would 
dismiss militarism in foreign policy, racism and plutocracy at home, and the form of 
corporate liberalism that perpetuated it—all the while offering a critique of the dogmatic 
leftist ideology that challenged it all.  As a result, his work during the sixties began to 
focus less on the function of political theory and more on providing a detailed portrait of 
the radical liberal. 
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A Strained Relationship with Radicalisms 
As Kaufman’s thought evolved he gave more exact shape to his definition of 
radicalism.   Like Dewey before him, and Hayden and SDS after, the term “radicalism” 
was meant to suggest a method and perspective that was compatible with liberalism.  
Early SDS thought would invoke Kaufman’s liberalism, one that was fundamentally 
rooted in a via media.  Dewey had rejected Marx as well as classical liberalism just as 
Kaufman would reject the radicalism of the Weathermen as well as corporate liberalism – 
the latter being a term that suggested the New Deal had only succeeded in creating a 
regulatory state that catered to corporate interests, not those of average Americans.   For 
Kaufman, radicalism meant acknowledging uncertainty in an effort to look for the root 
cause of problems.  As was evident in “The Nature and Function of Political Theory,” he 
accepted Dewey’s epistemology, and argued that truth was contingent and a theorist 
should adopt an experimental approach to problem solving.  Radicalism, as Hayden 
would echo later, was a style and manner of viewing the world.  As a via media, 
Kaufman’s radicalism challenged what he termed “the politics of pseudo realism,” a 
perspective that was rooted in Lippmann’s work, and “the politics of self-indulgence,” 
which was largely exemplified by members of the student and civil rights movements 
who turned toward blind political action in a search for authenticity.18   
His relationship to SDS became strained in the years following his attendance at 
the Port Huron conference in 1962, where Hayden and other members of the student 
organization edited their founding manifesto.  The increasing rhetoric of violent 
revolution and talk of co-optation among New Leftists directly challenged Kaufman’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Arnold S. Kaufman, The Radical Liberal:  New Man in American Politics (New York:  Atherton Press, 
1968) 3.  The politics of self-indulgence and pseudo-realism will be addressed below. 
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analysis of liberal reform.  By 1968 he produced a work that was meant to confront two 
opposing trends in American political culture: realism and Marxism.  The Radical 
Liberal:  New Man in American Politics (1968) suggested of the two trends:  “The former 
is rooted in the belief that political action in pursuit of goals that are not ‘possible’ or 
‘practical’ is irrational.  The latter, in the belief that political action that does not express 
to the full a person’s ‘authentic’ moral feelings is insincere and immoral.”19 
 While The Radical Liberal served as book-length description of these two 
sentiments, Kaufman had actually hinted at them earlier.  In an article entitled 
“Radicalism and Conventional Politics” (1967), he addressed a common trajectory for 
one-time radicals turned establishment liberals.  Activists who sought to change the 
system because they viewed existing circumstances as “catastrophically evil” often chose 
to work outside of electoral politics because it was deemed invariably as corrupt.  Instead 
of working against common enemies, radicals and radical movements multiplied as they 
deemed their respective causes as unique and morally authentic.  As a result, “Opposition 
to the catastrophic evil is thus fragmented, becomes even less effective than before, and 
intensifies the radicalizing processes.  Those newly estranged from conventional politics 
in turn comfort themselves with the thought that they are the only men of true conscience 
in the country.” 20   For Kaufman, these radicals were dogmatic in their commitment to 
unconventional political action, developing a fixed model of social change that obscured 
possible alternatives. However, once it appeared that governing institutions were 
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20 Arnold S. Kaufman, “Radicalism and Conventional Politics” (Dissent vol. 15, no. 4, July 1967) 433-435.  
Other than mentioning Irving Howe, Kaufman’s discussion of the radicalizing process remained mostly 
abstract.  He did, however, use anti-war and civil rights activism as brief examples of this trend.     
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attempting to respond to public demands and alleviate specific problems, some activists 
would be absorbed back into the system.  
 In some cases, those who were absorbed back into the system felt betrayed by 
their original commitment to radical causes.  “[T]hey feel like they were duped into 
dropping out in the first place and, as a result, become an advocate for the American 
system – critical of those who want to change it radically.”  For Kaufman, these 
developments essentially defined the relationship between the Old and New Lefts.  
Writers like Irving Howe were no longer willing to challenge the status quo as the New 
Left was.  However, the New Left drifted too far outside of existing political channels, a 
path that would lead to factionalism and ineffectuality.21  In order to prevent a lapse back 
into this cycle, he suggested that leftists not cast political problems in catastrophic terms, 
which only perpetuated dogmatic appeals to closed theories.  “There is an enormous 
amount to be done, and it is foolish to suppose that any particular strategic perspective 
chart the one true way.”22    
 A radical left had to understand problems in a way that led to finding constructive 
solutions.  For Kaufman, as with Dewey earlier, the tendency for theorists to break into 
conservative and radical camps – wherein radicals advocated scrapping liberalism 
altogether – suggested that a form of liberalism itself might be radical simply because it 
posed a solution that fell outside of the debate between classical liberals and Marxists.  In 
an article entitled, “A Philosophy for the American Left” (1963), he stated: “As I 
understand radicalism, and my conception is rooted in a great classical tradition, it 
essentially involves three things:  a temper of mind, a conviction about the existence of 
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22 Ibid., 439. 
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great social evils, and a firm commitment to the methods of reason.”23  The temper of 
mind, firm commitment, and use of reason are all elements that appeared in Dewey’s 
political theory and would later appear in Hayden’s writing.  Additionally, the radical 
style presumed a willingness to enter discourse and an appreciation of dissent. “It is just 
such appreciation which makes a stable yet dynamically changing democratic order 
possible.”24 
 Kaufman’s vision of radicalism fell outside a Marxist conception of a 
revolutionary social order where a violent lower class would seize the power of the elite.  
However, he did not deny that inequality existed to an alarming degree. He argued, “If 
justice does not demand absolute equality, it surely demands something different from 
the incredible inequalities which presently exist.”25  While he did not articulate a need for 
a form of economic leveling or a communist revolution, he was a champion for a 
radically different democratic order.  He argued: 
Taken altogether we have here a massive, and extraordinarily complex, problem.  
It behooves the genuine radical to be deeply concerned about these developments, 
because he, as mush as any, has a deep commitment to a stake in the building of a 
social system in which the relations between persons are marked by respect for 
each person’s dignity and capacity for deliberation. 26   
 
As it was for Dewey, democracy was a radical ideal, one that had not yet been realized in 
practice.  A radical was a champion of deliberation and participation as components of a 
more humane political system that curbed the power of moneyed interests.  While 
radicalism admitted of no terminus in the process of change, it did suggest a method that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
23 Arnold S. Kaufman, “A Philosophy for the American Left” (Socialist Commentary, November 1963), 13. 
 
24 Ibid. 
 
25 Ibid., 14. 
 
26 Ibid., 14-15. 
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was directive, experimental, and communicative.  Kaufman had these elements in mind 
when he sought to recast the terms of democracy for the New Left. 
 
A Democracy of Participation:  An Ultimate Ideal 
 Kaufman argued that political theory should serve an experimental function, 
allowing the theorist to explore social and political problems free of a dogmatic lens.  
Radicalism meant committing to such a method completely and acknowledging the 
potential of the liberal tradition to correct social problems even in the face of its obvious 
defects.  The majority of his writing in the sixties and early seventies was devoted to 
applying these ideas to American politics.  Not only did Kaufman offer written analyses 
of the movements for racial equality, economic justice, and strengthening organized 
labor, he also worked as an activists for organizations such as the Congress of Racial 
Equality (CORE), the New Democratic Coalitions (NDC), the Poor People’s Campaign 
(PPC), and was committed to the teach-in movement.   As mentioned earlier, his thoughts 
on political theory became clearer in the latter half of the sixties as he became critical of 
the New Left’s anti-liberal turn.  However, the programs he outlined early in the decade 
had influenced Hayden and SDS – especially during their formative years.  Chief among 
Kaufman’s ideas that appeared in The Port Huron Statement were his analysis of the 
Welfare State and his prescription for a participatory democracy. 
 In a review entitled “The Affluent Underdog:  British Labor in Crisis” (1960), 
Kaufman explored the history of the Welfare State in an effort to provide a critical 
analysis of essays written by Anthony Crosland and Richard Crossman.  Both authors 
held that the successes of the Welfare State required the left to reconstruct its strategies in 
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order to remain relevant in an age where the state guaranteed basic necessities to the 
laboring classes.   Crosland emphasized the importance of maintaining a focus on the 
practical over the theoretical while Crossman suggested just the opposite.   Although 
Kaufman tended to agree more with Crossman, arguing that there must be a strong 
understanding of theory, or ultimate ideals, he suggested that both authors had missed the 
mark on application of theory to practice. 
 Instead of focusing solely on a fixed theoretical goal, Kaufman wanted to blend 
an appreciation for theory with an understanding of the value of immediate, practical 
programs for the left.   His analysis comes back to the method he established in his work 
on the function of political theory.  He argued that theory needed to serve an instrumental 
function and progress should be evaluated with reference to intermediate and ultimate 
ideals.  The Welfare State had undermined the rhetoric of the left.  Organized labor could 
be co-opted – becoming an affluent underdog in society – if the left did not define new 
ideals.  Using the economist Gunnar Myrdal’s work on modern democracy as a 
foundation, Kaufman argued: 
The Welfare State may be satisfactory, but it is not richly satisfying; a third state 
is required.  To transform the shallow Welfare State into a truly good society the 
creation of a genuine democracy of participation is necessary.  Like John Dewey, 
Myrdal believes that it is necessary to reconstruct the social order so that 
individual human beings come to play an effective role in the creation of policies, 
institutions, of the very values that shape their lives.  This devolution of power 
must be achieved without dismantling that structure of laws and institutions which 
enables coherent planning.27 
 
The history of the Welfare State passed through two stages:  limited state intervention in 
the economy defined the first stage while greater state planning and regulation marked 
the second.  For the New Left, the New Deal represented that second stage in the United 
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States.  However, FDR’s reforms failed to produce a social arrangement that was 
satisfying for the public as Hayden and SDS would later indicate in The Port Huron 
Statement.  For Kaufman, who applied this analytical model to the Great Society, top-
down planning divorced individuals from the government, not allowing them to help 
determine the policies that would shape their lives.  The Welfare State would have to pass 
into a third stage of development – one that did not require an immediate revolution that 
dismantled existing institutions. 
Kaufman agreed with Dewey that participatory democracy was a necessary 
component for creating a just social order.  Like Dewey, he felt compelled to defend such 
a proposition against the claims of realists who argued that most humans were inherently 
irrational, making greater participation a disastrous idea.  In “Participatory Democracy 
and Human Nature” (1960), he argued that opponents of participatory democracy fall into 
two camps: those who believe human deficiencies are redeemable and those who believe 
they are irredeemable.   Of the former, he used Walter Lippmann’s critique of democracy 
as an example.  According to Lippmann, the industrial age had instilled in Americans an 
insatiable and self-centered acquisitive desire, a trait that made them incapable of 
considering problems in a broader, complicated social context.  For Kaufman, most 
liberals who arrived at these conclusions either suggested educational institutions would 
have to train citizens or government would have to be facilitated by experts.  
Lippmann had opted for a form of oligarchy – or rule by an elite.  In order to 
redeem the average American or a select few, educational institutions would have to be 
overhauled and designed to train responsible citizens.  Kaufman found both solutions 
inadequate. “In fact, performance of an educational task the size of that required is bound 
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to reflect the defects of the surrounding community.  Education cannot escape being 
corrupted by what is evil in its social context.  The alternative, education for an elite, is 
not just nor can it serve the function Lippmann would require of it."28  Participatory 
democracy was not strictly a moral imperative – it served a crucial educational function 
in addition to helping create a more democratic society, a conclusion that impacted the 
thought of SDS.   While some realists had considered human nature redeemable, there 
were also those who disagreed.   
Citing Niebuhr and Freud, Kaufman argued that those who suggested human 
nature was irredeemable typically offered religious or psychological justifications for 
their beliefs.  However, Niebuhr’s claim that God intended human nature to be deeply 
flawed was essentially a psychological argument.  Man’s inability to function as a 
reasonable political being, while possibly originating in God’s will, actually resided in 
the irrational motives of the human psyche.  Realists of this camp typically defined 
democracy as a system to regulate countervailing power arrangements.  Like Dewey, 
Kaufman thought such a definition stripped democracy of all its radical and humane 
implications.  Participatory democracy was valuable not for “the extent to which it 
protects or stabilizes a community, but the contribution it can make to the development of 
human powers of thought, feeling, and action.  In this respect it differs, and differs quite 
fundamentally, from a representative system incorporating all sorts of institutional 
features designed to safeguard human rights and ensure social order."29  The critique that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Arnold S. Kaufman, "Participatory Democracy and Human Nature," taken from William E. Connolly ed. 
The Bias of Pluralism (New York: Atherton, 1969) 180. 
 
29 Ibid., 184. 
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realists confused the meaning and purpose of democracy was rooted in Dewey’s work 
and would also appear in the writing of Hayden and SDS.  
  Of the realist conception of politics in general, Kaufman concluded that it was 
built on a presumptuous dismissal of human potential.  Of the participatory and realist 
conceptions of democracy he wrote:  “The first has more to do with what can be done to 
men, with the development of distinctively human powers; the second with what can be 
done for men, with protection against tyranny and establishment of social order."30  
Resembling the historicism of Dewey, he argued that increased interdependence and 
complexity of the state and the economy made classical liberalism inapplicable in the 
modern age.  In a passage that could have been written by Dewey, he argued: 
In modern industrial societies men can successfully assume responsibility for the 
direction of many affairs which today they regard as largely irrelevant to their 
lives because these affairs seem so remote.  Moreover, in the case of those types 
of decision which it is best, for other reasons, to put into the hands of delegated 
agents, the best agents will be selected when those who make the selection have 
direct responsibility for decisions which are similar to those with which the agent 
will be entrusted.31 
 
Similarly, Dewey had suggested that modern industry changed the political landscape of 
the country and that liberal ideas failed to keep pace with these changes.   
The public was lost, unable to identify itself as a unique political entity, as well as 
bear influence on policy decisions.  Here Kaufman arrived at similar conclusions: the gap 
between government and governed had to be closed by ensuring that representative 
agents were chosen by a public that understood the responsibilities and problems 
associated with policy-making.  Greater individual participation in local government or 
reform movements such as SDS could create a citizenry capable of rising to that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Ibid., 188. 
 
31 Ibid., 189-190. 
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occasion.  Also implicit here was a comment about individualism: liberalism was 
misconceived in the modern age if it only purported to protect the individual from the 
power and interference of government.  Kaufman’s radical liberalism would build on a 
new definition of freedom.    
 
On Radical Liberalism 
The challenges for constructing a liberal theory that was relevant to contemporary 
problems were significant.  One of the most notable obstacles was the New Left itself.  
Kaufman believed students had succumbed to excessive moralizing in politics.  As noted 
earlier, he was attempting to construct a radical liberalism that could meet the demands of 
the New Left, save what he thought were the redeeming elements of a classical tradition, 
and refute realists as well as Marx.  At first glance, The Radical Liberal:  New Man in 
American Politics (1968) is a defense of moderate political strategies written during a 
time when New Leftists were challenging the previous generation of radical American 
thinkers.  While this is certainly true, the book also served a more subtle purpose.  As 
with his other works, The Radical Liberal outlined a politics of contingency and 
pluralism.  As a via media, the book situates Kaufman’s political theory in between and 
far outside the tenets of Marxism, realism, and corporate liberalism. 
Agreeing with Dewey, Kaufman argued that liberals could find little value in 
Marxist thought.  The Marxist lens limited the scope of historical development by 
suggesting humanity could reach a utopian state where injustice and alienated labor 
would no longer exist.  Liberals, however, rejected the belief that all social ills would be 
remedied once alienated labor disappeared.  Kaufman wrote, “In particular, liberals are 
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convinced that political democracy… is independent of alienation of labor, and just as 
basic to the realization of a good society.”32  Liberals were skeptics in regard to a final 
stage of history – there would always be a need for a system to formally organize dissent.  
They did not reject Marxist claims about the need for distributive justice and the 
necessity of ending alienated labor, but they did not accept that these prescriptions would 
bring an end to all social problems.  For Kaufman, the basic elements of liberalism were 
not at odds with Marxist claims about social justice.  However, democracy denoted an 
on-going process of reform, one that did not terminate in a fixed historical destination. 
Kaufman followed Dewey when he defined a liberalism that was markedly 
different from the classical doctrine that stressed laissez-faire economics and unfettered 
individualism.  Accordingly, “In a brief sentence, liberals believe that a good society is 
one in which each person possesses the resources of materials, mind, and spirit, as well 
as the opportunities, to carve out a career in conformity to that person’s own nature and 
reasoned choice.”33  Liberalism’s original aims of individual freedom actually had radical 
implications for the meaning of social justice.  Reasoned choice and reflective 
commitment were attributes that could only be acquired through greater participation in 
public affairs.  Further, the question of distributive justice implied that the nation’s 
materials and resources were being withheld from a significant portion of the population. 
Contrary to classical liberal doctrine, freedom of opportunity and greater individual 
access to material resources were concepts that could be not be evaluated independently 
of each other.  The distinction between positive and negative liberty was misleading. 
Equal opportunity was inherently linked to distributive justice.  
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33 Ibid., 6, his italics. 
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For Kaufman, the New Left failed to understand the radical implications of 
liberalism.  However, as he pointed out with little surprise, “We seem to have entered a 
political era in which the rhetoric of liberalism is unrestrainedly used either to defend 
programs of liberal reform that are minimal in magnitude and scope, or to rationalize 
programs that are illiberal in spirit and intent.”34  The New Left was understandably 
suspicious of the liberal tradition.  Kaufman was no stranger to claims about the co-
optive nature of American politics.  He admitted, “Parliamentary institutions have been 
used by vested power to shape the form of policy in manipulatively appealing ways, 
without affecting its substance.  And even when political democracy functions 
constructively, it is far from providing the panacea for social evils that many like to think 
it does.”35  Political and economic manipulation were products of a narrowly defined 
liberalism where “entrenched power of moneyed elites who, either out of habit or 
acquisitiveness, insist on interpreting the rhetoric of American freedom in the least 
human way possible.”36 
Radical liberalism would simultaneously challenge co-optation, realism, and the 
New Left’s rhetoric of revolution. As a work of political theory and an exposition of 
method, The Radical Liberal framed Kaufman’s own theory in reference to the two 
perspectives mentioned earlier:  the politics of pseudo-realism and the politics of self-
indulgence.  Both of these positions jeopardized liberal claims.  The former exaggerated 
the accomplishments of the Welfare State, suggesting capitalism had been humanized and 
significant reform was no longer necessary.  The latter suggested that politics should 
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36 Ibid., 16.   
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express an individual’s moral sentiments – political action should help the individual 
achieve “personal authenticity”37 – an idea that framed the Welfare State in the language 
of co-optation.   
Kaufman was critical of the Welfare State.  However, he largely saw it as a half-
finished revolution, not necessarily an attempt to co-opt leftist movements.  Liberalism 
certainly had manifest flaws.  He wrote,  “No other tradition has been as steady and 
relentless in its theoretical repudiation of tyrannical power.  But, for that very reason, the 
gap between liberal theory and liberal practice is a special disaster.”38  As Dewey had 
argued, the liberal obsession with individual freedom against tyranny allowed the 
tradition to petrify, becoming inflexible in the face of changing circumstances.  For 
Kaufman, a radical liberalism would not ignore historical circumstances.  It would have 
to navigate the flaws of the Welfare State as well as acknowledge the ways in which 
human liberty was actually impeded by the realist conception of politics.  As a result, he 
formulated a system that met the concerns of realists and still managed to incorporate a 
greater level of public participation in the political process.  A chapter in The Radical 
Liberal outlines an imaginary debate between a Madisonian and a Rousseaun political 
theorist, summarizing what Kaufman believed to be the competing claims of realists and 
participatory democrats. 
The liberalism he envisioned combined James Madison’s conception of 
countervailing power politics as well as Rousseau’s emphasis on greater participation.  A 
Madisonian system had certain benefits.  For example, it could be viewed as more stable 
and less chaotic than a participatory democracy.  Organized factions within formal 
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political parties could debate policy and develop broad organizational platforms as a 
result of the discourse.  But, as noted elsewhere, Kaufman thought the concern for 
stability blinded theorists to the existence of social inequality.  Countervailing power 
politics created channels in American political culture – intellectual ruts that would be 
difficult to challenge.  Debates would become predictable and would often revolve 
around a consensus that rejected radical thinking – a fear that was realized during the 
Cold War.39   
The only way to prevent discourse from growing sterile was to incorporate the 
perspectives of those who were often left out of the political system.  Participatory 
democracy would serve as an additional check in a Madisonian system.  Participatory 
institutions would encourage dialogue to an extent that had been absent in American 
politics.  While he advocated some combination of the two conceptions of democracy, 
Kaufman refused to provide a certain formula:  “There is, from this point of view, simply 
no general case to be made for adherence to one preferred tactic or another.  For there is 
no substitute for coldly reflective calculation based on knowledge of the concrete 
situation and comprehensive grasp of the entire range of liberal values we should seek to 
move toward.”40  Radical liberalism was open-ended, anti-dogmatic, and wedded to 
Deweyan experimentalism.  Participatory democracy would be paired with a politics of 
radical pressure, where leftists would attempt to pull the Democratic Party away from the 
political center.       
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Conclusion:  A Philosophy for the New Left? 
SDS was working within Kaufman’s political and philosophical model when it 
articulated a desire to create a participatory democracy.  Although Kaufman would later 
become critical of the movement, his influence and direct participation in the Port Huron 
conference is evidence of the degree to which he supported the organization and its initial 
goals.  The Port Huron Statement (1962) grapples with the same theoretical and practical 
problems that both Dewey and Kaufman outlined.  As a philosopher for the New Left, 
Kaufman consistently emphasized the value of a radical liberal tradition over Marxist and 
realist theories.   
As a radical, he suggested pluralism and contingency would always be 
fundamental traits in a democracy.  Closed theories or definitions would lead to a tyranny 
of the mind and inflexibility in method.  He took pluralism and contingency to heart 
when he challenged dogma in the liberal tradition.  Like Dewey, he sought to disassociate 
the concept of negative freedom from liberalism.  Freedom from restraint was an 
outmoded doctrine.  Radicalism meant acknowledging that negative freedom had no 
value if the individual’s ability to act was limited by a dearth of material resources.  His 
method was experimental, only relying on political theory insofar as it served an 
instrumental function.  Strategies and conclusion would always be subject to change as 
historical circumstances altered the landscape for social action.  
Kaufman never abandoned his commitment to radical liberalism, even as the New 
Left became increasingly anti-liberal.  In an essay entitled, “Participatory Democracy:  
Ten Years Later” (1969), he argued that the New Left’s “mindless” application of 
participatory democracy had devalued its meaning but the concept was still useful if 
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correctly understood.  He still maintained that participatory institutions could curb 
corporate power, racism, and economic injustice as long as they were employed 
alongside a strategy of coalition politics.  While he admitted that the New Left was prone 
to moralizing, he did understand the need for a moral foundation for radical thought.  In 
The Radical Liberal he hinted that he wanted to write a book that would outline the moral 
foundations of his political theory.  However, he died before he could complete such a 
work.  On June 6th, 1971, an air force pilot flew off course and ejected from his plane 
before it collided with a passenger jet on which Arnold Kaufman was aboard.41
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CHAPTER IV 
 
OF SDS AND A POLITICAL THEORY FOR THE NEW LEFT 
 
The radical style… takes as its presupposition Dewey’s claim that we are free to  
the extent that we know what we are about.  Radicalism as a style involves  
penetration of a social problem to its roots, to its real causes.  Radicalism  
presumes a willingness to continually press forward the query:  Why?   
Radicalism finds no rest in conclusions; answers are seen as provisional,  
to be discarded in the face of new evidence or changed conditions. 
Tom Hayden (1961) 
The search for truly democratic alternatives to the present, and a commitment  
to social experimentation with them, is a worthy and fulfilling human  
enterprise, one which moves us and, we hope, others today. 
SDS (1962) 
 
  
 Dewey provided a framework for thinking about a radical liberalism, one that 
turned the classical doctrine of laissez-faire on its head.  The political process should not 
be divorced from individual action – greater participation would encourage human 
development and cast a critical light on the concept of American individualism.  In the 
process of constructing a flexible political theory, he provided new meaning to the term 
‘radical.’  Radical epistemology stripped closed political theories of currency by 
suggesting that truth could never be definite.  All ideas, beliefs, and conclusions were 
subject to change based on experience, reasoned analysis, and the outcomes of an 
experimental approach to social problems.  Likewise, Kaufman’s method emphasized 
pluralism and contingency – democracy was defined by dialogue, truth-testing, and 
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experimentalism.  For him, radicalism implied that political theory should serve an 
instrumental function.  The process of change would be ongoing – there was no utopian 
final stage of history where reform would no longer be necessary – and theory should 
only serve a directive purpose.  Hayden and SDS would recycle a number of these themes 
as well as a few of the details that appeared in the work of Kaufman and Dewey.   
 Hayden and SDS drew from the liberalism of Dewey and Kaufman in the early 
sixties.  Their definition of radicalism incorporated Dewey’s epistemology and 
experimentalism as well as Kaufman’s political theory and his defense of participatory 
democracy.  Like Kaufman’s radical liberal, SDS was committed to a politics of 
contingency and pluralism.  If all conclusions were tentative, then all perspectives must 
be explored through reasoned and thoughtful discussion – greater participation in policy-
making would be crucial to such a political arrangement.  Once again, critiques of the 
New Deal and Walter Lippmann would surface as a generation of young intellectuals and 
activists challenged the assumptions of the Cold War.   
Hayden’s “A Letter to the New (Young) Left” (1961), and SDS’s Port Huron 
Statement (1962) and America and the New Era (1963) raised questions about the Cold 
War liberal consensus.  For SDS, liberalism had become a form of dogma in the United 
States – a doctrine that simultaneously justified inequality and oppression and, yet, 
upheld the ideals of individual freedom and individual thought in an ideological battle 
against communism.  Instead of abandoning the liberal tradition, Hayden and SDS 
wanted to reinvigorate its emphasis on freedom and equality in an age where racism, 
poverty, militarism, and the existence of corporate elites made most activists apathetic 
about social change. 
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Navigating Isms: Hayden’s Model for a Radical New Left          
The convention that began on June 12, 1962 in Port Huron, Michigan marked one 
of the earliest collective memories for the founding members of SDS.  Lasting from a 
Tuesday to early Saturday morning, the convention provided members of the still 
fledgling student organization the opportunity to pore over and amend Tom Hayden’s 
draft of The Port Huron Statement.  Consisting of 59 formally registered participants, the 
conference would be a venue for debating and editing the group’s founding manifesto, 
activities that would form lasting impressions about the role of face-to-face politics on 
the activists’ minds.1  However, while the convention would help redraft the document, it 
was clear that Hayden was its chief “architect.”  According to Bob Ross, “Tom was The 
Writer.  Everyone knew that he was The Writer.  That was something in between being a 
recorder of people’s ideas and saying to people, ‘This is what you really mean.’  Tom 
was a genuine leader.  He led because he really did express what people wanted… he was 
the architect.”2    The document itself represented a culmination of Hayden’s political and 
social thought as well as the political theory of early SDS.   Many of the themes present 
in the piece, a tension between an existentialist revolutionary politics and radical 
liberalism as well as between thought and action, had actually appeared a year earlier in 
Hayden’s “A Letter to the New (Young) Left.”   
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2 Ibid., 108. 
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Published in The Activist in 1961 for the purpose of recruiting members to the 
new student organization,3 Hayden’s response to C. Wright Mills’ “Letter to the New 
Left” explored and evaluated different theoretical perspectives that were open to young 
activists.  In a new introduction to the document, written in 2008, Hayden remarked, 
“The tone is one of idealism, an awakening of feelings that were growing among an 
increasing number of activist circles on campuses around the country… What I find 
interesting, beneath the apocalyptic tone, is the persistent emphasis on testing and 
learning from experience itself, not ideologies or paradigms.”4  Hayden’s essay 
consistently emphasized an experimental approach to problem solving.  Much like 
Dewey and Kaufman, Hayden was confronted with what he viewed as competing 
conceptual models for understanding a static social order, one that resisted real 
democratic change.   For Dewey, the problem resided in the inability of politically 
conscious citizens to recognize an always-present set of changing circumstances.  
Kaufman had arrived at similar conclusions, and, following Dewey’s thought, suggested 
that political theory should serve an experimental purpose.   The possibility of navigating 
transitional periods would require openness to learning from experience.  
The dilemma for Hayden was shaped by a need to maneuver between different 
approaches to social justice.  On the one hand there was the theoretical approach of 
American Marxists—especially those of the Old Left of the previous generation—whom 
most SDS members regarded in a critical light.  Hayden suggested, “Marx, especially 
Marx the humanist, has much to tell us but his conceptual tools are outmoded and his 
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final vision implausible.”5  Fixed ideas or conceptual models of the historical process 
could lead to inflexibility, a result that would seriously inhibit a social movement that 
sought change in a dynamic world.  Disillusionment with the ideas of traditional leftists 
also presented challenges by encouraging an apathetic attitude. “The American 
intellectuals?  C. Wright Mills is appealing and dynamic in his expression of theory in the 
grand manner, but his pessimism yields us no formulas, no path out of the dark, and his 
polemicism sometimes offends the critical sense.”6 
  On the other hand, there was the body of political thought proposed by 
conservatives and democratic realists.  Hayden wrote, “Their themes purport to be 
different but always the same impressions emerge:  Man is inherently incapable of 
building a good society; man’s passionate causes are nothing more than dangerous 
psychic sprees… ideals have little place in politics.”7  The reference to psychic sprees 
comes back to Kaufman’s defense of participatory democracy.  Responding to the same 
realist trend in American political theory, he had argued that realists confused the 
function of democracy – considering it an arrangement meant to protect the public from 
irrational individuals or groups and not a system that was designed to promote individual 
powers of thought and action – because they tended to reduce human motives to irrational 
psychological desires.  Conservatives and realists suggested greater participation was an 
untenable ideal.   
As a backlash to the ideology of the left, the resistance to ideals in politics 
concealed a number of theoretical assumptions that were held by both conservatives and 
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some moderates.  The vision of society that developed from this perspective was one of 
autonomous, self-interested individuals whose wellbeing was best served by limited 
government interference.  The form of negative freedom that emerged out of this picture 
of society did not account for a broader understanding of the social good.  It rejected any 
alternative to a narrow definition of individualism out of principle, regardless of changing 
circumstances or experiences.  Along with some ideologies of the left, this theoretical 
perspective was rigid and closed to dialogue.     
Resembling Dewey’s method of proposing solutions, Hayden set out to refute two 
approaches—one conservative, the other considered radical, and both fixed by a firmly 
held ideology—and, in the process, provide a third option that navigated and managed to 
avoid the theoretical problems associated with the first two.  Following in the vein of 
Dewey and Kaufman, Hayden called for a redefinition of radicalism: 
The radical style… takes as its presupposition Dewey’s claim that we are free to 
the extent that we know what we are about.  Radicalism as a style involves 
penetration of a social problem to its roots, to its real causes.  Radicalism 
presumes a willingness to continually press forward the query:  Why?  Radicalism 
finds no rest in conclusions; answers are seen as provisional, to be discarded in 
the face of new evidence or changed conditions.  This is, in one sense, a difficult 
mental task and, in a more profound moral sense, it represents a serious personal 
decision to be introspective, to be exposed always to the stinging glare of change, 
to be willing always to reconstruct our social views.8  
 
Radicalism was not defined by a blind adherence to dogma, not matter how revolutionary 
an outcome it predicted.  Following Kaufman, who argued radicalism was a temper of 
mind that emphasized reason, contingency, and unyielding commitment, Hayden 
emphasized devotion in the face of uncertainty.  Further, ideologies thought to be radical 
always had the potential to become sterile depending on historical circumstances.  
Channeling Dewey, who once argued that the revolutionary notion of individualism 
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presented by classical liberals had become a torpid ideology that prevented society from 
adapting to changing conditions, Hayden suggested that the potency of Marxist doctrine 
had dissolved as a result of the ideology’s inability to readily adapt to an ever-changing 
world.      
 In the background of Hayden’s comment about radicalism were Dewey’s 
epistemology and democratic theory.  The pluralism of the pragmatists, which suggested 
that “truth” was always subject to revision, required constant attention to the outcomes of 
policy among an educated citizenry.  In the realm of politics, such vigilance could only 
be realized in a radical conception of democracy.  In the 1937 essay, Democracy is 
Radical, Dewey explained that older concepts of liberalism needed to be reevaluated in 
terms of an increasingly necessary concern for the social good over an unbending 
conception of individual rights. Dewey wrote, “There is no opposition in standing for 
liberal democratic means combined with ends that are socially radical.  There is not only 
no contradiction, but neither history nor human nature gives any reason for supposing 
that socially radical ends can be attained by any other than liberal democratic means.”9  
Under such circumstances, progress would be varied, radical in nature, and incremental 
in development.  Hayden remarked, “Our gains will be modest, not sensational.  It will be 
slow and exhaustingly complex, lasting at the very least for our lifetimes.”10         
 Along those lines, Hayden’s letter to the student left also suggested the 
importance of not confusing the goals of the student movement with those of more 
conservative politicians who made moderate attempts to treat symptoms, but not social 
problems.  “That is problem-mitigating, not problem-solving.  That is useful… but not 
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10 Op. cit., Tom Hayden, Writings for a Democratic Society, 26. 
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radical for it in no sense identifies and deals with the underlying political-economic-
historic-psychological bases of the problem.”11  These statements, which are echoed in 
The Port Huron Statement, harked back to Kaufman’s analysis of the function of ultimate 
ideals and immediate goals in political theory.  Immediate goals should provide a 
standard for determining to what degree activists were making progress toward reaching 
a clearly defined ideal.  As Hayden remarked, progress would be slow and complicated, 
but as long as the overall trajectory was toward a revolutionary ideal, activists would be 
less likely to treat only symptoms of larger problems.  Further, “Radicalism, it seems to 
me, does not exclude morality; it invites and is given spirit by the quality of reflective 
commitment, the combining of our passion and our critical talents into a provisional 
position.  To remove an idea from the plane of abstraction, it should be added, means to 
inject its meaning into our total life”.12     
 To inject an idea’s meaning into everyday life required a radical commitment on 
the part of the activist who sought to redefine a nation’s political ideals.  In many ways 
these ideas would be put into practice at the conference in Port Huron.  Dewey’s claim 
that “democracy is a personal way of individual life; that it signifies the possession and 
continual use of certain attitudes, forming personal character and determining desire and 
purpose in all the relations of life” captured the broader project and implications of the 
Port Huron conference.  
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A Living Document:  The Port Huron Statement and Participatory Democracy   
The group of students who participated in the conference came from diverse 
political backgrounds including liberals, socialists, and Marxists as well as delegations 
from groups such as the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee and the National 
Student Christian Federation to name a few.13  The felt difficulty of managing divergent 
perspectives in editing Hayden’s lengthy draft, which would become a foundational 
statement for SDS, was evident in a preconvention meeting.  According to Hayden, “I 
remember people sitting around a room feeling really hopeless… To somehow transform 
it [the original draft] in three days, seemed impossible.”14  To accomplish the task, the 
active15 members of the convention were broken into eight groups, each of which would 
discuss and edit sections of the statement.  In these separate sessions, members would 
unpack and debate several points and themes in the document.   
The face-to-face deliberations required to craft the finished draft of the manifesto 
were essentially an expression of participatory democracy in action.  Not only did the 
convention include an overtly educative component, consisting of an “educational 
conference” where speakers addressed topics from civil rights to philosophy16, the 
activity of debating the rough draft was a form of political education.  Richard Flacks 
later recalled, “I felt like I had been reborn, in the political sense… I thought we had done 
something important.”17  The Port Huron Statement, which was produced by a close 
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14 Ibid., 109.  Hayden qtd. in Miller. 
 
15 Some attendees were present as observers, not active participants. 
 
16 Ibid., 125. 
 
17 Ibid. 
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community of young activists, was presented as a first step towards establishing a more 
general dialogue with American society, one that was to remain open to different 
perspectives and not restricted by ideology. 
Presented as a “living document,”18 The Port Huron Statement would always be 
subject to change.  Hayden remarked, with regard to the concern expressed by members 
of the convention that the document might require extensive revisions, “One of the things 
that got people committed was an agreement that whatever we came out with would not 
be final, but that it would be offered as a discussion paper to our generation.”19  As an 
introductory note in the statement suggested, “It is a beginning:  In our own debate and 
education, in our dialogue with society.”20  The document was immediately presented as 
non-ideological.  Education and new experiences would always present new perspectives 
and conclusions, from which the founding principles of SDS would be scrutinized.  
Accordingly, as a founding manifesto, it served as a flexible foundation that required no 
ideological commitment, only a willingness to reconsider American democracy in open 
dialogue with a broader community.  With an emphasis on experimentalism and 
pluralism, these introductory notes outlined Dewey and Kaufman’s methods for 
approaching social change.  
Similar to Hayden’s “Letter to the New (Young) Left”, The Port Huron Statement 
was also reminiscent of Dewey’s method for organizing arguments. The formal 
introduction, entitled “Agenda For a Generation,” outlined the broader goals of SDS as 
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19 Op. cit., James Miller, Democracy Is In the Streets, 109. 
 
20 Op. cit., The Port Huron Statement, 1. 
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well as the problems that had faced their generation.  "Although mankind desperately 
needs revolutionary leadership, America rests in national stalemate, its goals ambiguous 
and tradition-bound instead of informed and clear, its democratic system apathetic and 
manipulated rather than 'of, by, and for the people.'"21  For Dewey, political and social 
problems resulted from static conceptual frameworks, an unwillingness to reconsider old 
ideas in light of new experiences.  Most of his work on political theory started with this 
supposition and then proceeded to explicate how new concepts become static and prevent 
creative responses to emerging problems. 
 The Port Huron Statement suggested that the original promises of democracy 
have been subverted in the United States.  In many cases the will of the people was not a 
consideration in decisions regarding economic or foreign policy.  “The American 
political system is not the democratic model of which its glorifiers speak.  In actuality it 
frustrates democracy by confusing the individual citizen, paralyzing policy discussion, 
and consolidating the irresponsible power of military and business interests.”22   As most 
intellectual historians of the period have noted, this argument reaches back to Mills and 
his work on the “power elite.”  The picture that emerged was one of a nation whose 
political, economic, and social systems were largely controlled by an oligarchy consisting 
of leaders from the military, top corporations, and Washington D.C.  However, by 
stepping back and looking at the broader theoretical context, it becomes clear that these 
arguments extended beyond Mills.  While activists did believe elites had corrupted 
democracy in America, another, larger conceptual problem was exemplified by the Cold 
War.  Ideological rigidity seemed to define American politics in the post-war world. 
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Not only did the Cold War lead to the excesses of McCarthyism, but it also 
represented a more general American resistance to considering “truth” through a 
pluralistic lens, thus denying contingency. In response to the political stalemate and 
tradition bound culture of the United States, SDS proposed, “Our goal is guided by the 
sense that we may be the last generation in the experiment with living.  But we are a 
minority -- the vast majority of our people regard the temporary equilibriums of our 
society and world as eternally-functional parts.”23  The majority of Americans were not 
able to envision political change as result of being unable to think beyond the Cold War 
definition of democracy and its role in an ideological conflict with the Soviet Union.  
"They fear change itself, since change might smash whatever invisible framework seems 
to hold back chaos for them now."24  However, the Cold War was not solely responsible 
for the existence of a corrupted, inflexible political theory.   
According to Hayden there was a broader historical trend at work in the United 
States that encouraged the persistence of a collapsed theory of democracy.  In the original 
draft of The Port Huron Statement he wrote, “American politics are built on a desire to 
deploy and neutralize the ‘evil drives’ of men… Politics today are organized for policy 
paralysis and minority domination, not for fluid change and mass participation.”25  The 
reference to the evil drives of men is drawn from Kaufman’s criticism of realist theories 
that had their basis in pseudo psychology.  As a response to democratic realists such as 
Walter Lippmann, who, writing decades earlier, once suggested that an election on the 
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25 Taken from: http://www.sds-1960s.org/PortHuronStatement-draft.htm 
-- SDS-1960s.org 
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basis of majority-rule is “a sublimated and denatured civil war,”26 Hayden argued that a 
government of elites would resist any kind of radical policy change, regardless of the will 
of the people.  The sense that politics should be left to qualified professionals, who are 
not necessarily held accountable to the public for every decision made on their behalf, 
represented a larger historical trend in the United States. “Calcification (under the name 
of “responsible progress with stability”) dominates flexibility as the principle of 
parliamentary organization.”27  American democracy had a propensity to become static, 
unable to account for the changing nature of the public as well as the dynamic 
circumstances that defined each citizen’s life.  A model of democracy that did not take 
seriously the role of the public in decision-making would create a society that resisted 
social change.  Democratic theory in the United States was in need of a radical 
reorientation. 
 On the one hand, SDS was acutely aware of what they considered to be the 
mistakes of the ideologues of the Old Left.  In many ways they espoused a theory of 
social change that was divorced from historical experience and the reality of social 
conditions.  On the other hand, the classical liberal and democratic realist models of 
democracy also had a tendency to divorce theory from experience.  To protect individual 
rights in a system of countervailing power politics regardless of considerations of a 
broader social context was to fail to understand the historical nature of a given problem.  
In short, these early activists were searching for a model that navigated historically 
opposed ideas, could establish tentative theoretical suppositions, and never calcify as did 
past ideologies.  “Perhaps matured by the past, we have no sure formulas, no closed 
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27 Op. cit., Hayden, original draft PHS, 9. 
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theories -- but that does not mean values are beyond discussion and tentative 
determination.”28  SDS needed to formulate a political theory that was at once radical, 
challenging both mainstream liberals – or establishment liberals, so-called for their 
resistance to social or economic change – and conservatives, as well as capable of 
accounting for unique historical conditions irrespective of any ideological lens.  The 
concept of “participatory democracy,” which is synonymous with SDS, provided the 
theoretical framework that could navigate extremes, avoid foundationalism, and, yet, still 
offer the working bases of assumptions necessary for a coherent political philosophy.  
Participatory democracy originated out of a need to rethink ideological debates 
in the United States.  In many ways it was the New Left’s own via media,29 a method of 
historical change and a view of human relationships that fell between revolutionary 
socialism and the more conservative tenets of liberalism.  As Miller has noted, 
participatory democracy was never clearly defined in The Port Huron Statement, a fact 
that led to confusion over the concept among members of SDS.  He writes, “Participatory 
democracy was a catchword.  It became a cliché.  It masked a theoretical muddle.”30  
While the idea was never fully defined in the statement that does not mean it did not exist 
as a conceptual framework.  As a solution to a generation’s problems, a democracy of full 
participation could be defined in three ways.  First, as a concept that was intended to 
navigate tumultuous ideological debates it was deliberately ambiguous, leaving its exact 
definition to be determined in action and in reference to other theories.  Second, as a 
working concept, its chief presuppositions could be determined by comparing it to the 
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30 Op. cit., Miller, 152. 
76	  
	  
problem it was intended to solve—collapsed democracy.  Finally, the concept comes into 
sharper focus when one recognizes Dewey and Kaufman’s influence on the political 
theory of SDS.  
Participatory democracy was not a narrowly conceived political theory— as 
Kaufman argued it was a method for organizing and directing social relationships and 
action as well as human potential. The idea that "Men have unrealized potential for self-
cultivation, self-direction, self-understanding, and creativity"31 also suggested, similar to 
Dewey’s belief, that only by learning from experience in social interaction were humans 
able to realize their full potential.  Individual participation would discourage apathy 
among citizens as well as the lack of transparency found in a government organized to 
perpetuate the power of an elite.  Along these lines The Port Huron Statement suggested, 
“that decision-making of basic social consequences be carried on by public groupings.”32  
Accordingly: 
[T]he political order should serve to clarify problems in a way instrumental to 
their solutions; it should provide outlets for the expression of personal grievance 
and aspiration; opposing views should be organized so as to illuminate choices 
and facilities [sic] the  attainment of goals; channels should  be commonly 
available to relate men to knowledge and to power so that private problems... are 
formulated as general issues.33 
 
By encouraging action and mobilization on behalf of individuals, this radical theory of 
democracy would help bring lost publics back into the political fold.  As Dewey had once 
claimed, a critical community of citizens would represent a general will only present in a 
participatory democracy—one where majority rule is not simply defined as the political 
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power of a group of isolated individuals, but represents a collective, shared public 
sentiment.  Only through open communication, active engagement, and experimentalism 
would a critical public be able to affect change and, in the process, create participatory 
institutions. 
 As a via media, participatory democracy can also be defined in reference to the 
different political theories early SDS was attempting to navigate.  While maintaining the 
revolutionary aims of radical democracy, the method for historical change that SDS 
adopted was a direct refutation of both Marxism and establishment liberalism.34  The 
existence of racism and fervent anti-communism in both the Democratic and Republican 
parties drew criticism from SDS, which argued that party overlap in the United States 
undermined the promise of American democracy.  While they articulated a need for 
pluralism and radical social progress, the organization did not advocate abrupt 
revolutionary change.  “The ideals of political democracy, then, the imperative need for 
flexible decision-making apparatus makes a real two-party system an immediate social 
necessity.  What is desirable is sufficient party disagreement to dramatize major issues, 
yet sufficient party overlap to guarantee stable transitions from administration to 
administration.”35 Along the lines of Dewey, who emphasized the necessity of continuity 
in periods of historical change, and Kaufman, who established the importance of 
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maintaining flexible ultimate ideals, SDS argued that while democracy had been 
corrupted in America, it simply needed to be reoriented and to focus on social needs.  
 Reorientation not only meant a form of incrementalism over revolutionary 
politics, it also implied a rejection of the elements of classical liberalism that still resided 
in modern American political culture.  Following the line of argument Dewey had chosen 
in Liberalism and Social Action (1930), SDS argued that the persistence of old ideas 
amid new circumstances created a political culture that was unable to respond to new 
needs.  “We can no longer rely on competition of the many to insure that business 
enterprise is responsive to social needs.  The many have become the few.  Nor can we 
trust the corporate bureaucracy to be socially responsible or to develop ‘corporate 
conscience’ that is democratic.”36  Further, SDS offered a redefinition of American 
individualism.   
Like Dewey, who sought to recast individualism in an age of increasing 
interdependency, SDS challenged the social vs. individual binary that pervaded American 
politics. "As the individualism we affirm is not egoism, the selflessness we affirm is not 
self-elimination.  On the contrary, we believe in generosity of a kind that imprints one's 
unique individual qualities in the relation to other men, and to all human activity.”37  
Participatory democracy would contribute to a sense of community among a citizenry 
engaged in acts of collective problem solving.  The division between government and 
citizen would be erased as active publics filled auxiliary political roles.      
 Participatory democracy would challenge the excesses of Cold War politics and in 
the process define a political ideal in contrast to collapsed democracy.  Anti-communism 
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created a closed political and social atmosphere in the United States.  On a less abstract 
level, SDS raised questions about the role of pluralism in an age of consensus, where the 
absence of dissent helped to perpetuate a dangerous ideological conflict among nuclear 
powers. “Not only does it [anti-communism] lead to the perversion of democracy and to 
the political stagnation of a warfare society, but it also has the unintended consequence of 
preventing an honest and effective approach to the issues.  Such an approach would 
require public analysis and debate of world politics.”38  The Cold War was not the 
making of average Americans, nor was it in the nation’s interest to pursue aggressive 
policies in the international system.   
A stifling, inflexible anti-communism prevented dissent and, by extension, 
experimentalism.  As with Dewey and Kaufman, SDS suggested pluralism indicated 
more than accepting dissent as a part of the democratic process.  Avoiding Lippmann’s 
trap, where dissent served a limited function in a countervailing power model, SDS 
followed Kaufman and argued that pluralism meant accepting Dewey’s radical 
epistemology.  “Democracy, we are convinced, requires every effort to set in peaceful 
opposition the basic viewpoints of the day; only by conscious, determined, though 
difficult, efforts in this direction will the issue of communism be met appropriately.”39  
Basic viewpoints should never be taken as complete truths.  Without open dialogue the 
assumptions of the Cold War framework, and its implications for American democracy, 
would be accepted as a final truth without any kind of critical analysis.  Slowly moving 
from abstraction to practice, SDS identified participatory institutions and groups that 
remained critical in an age of consensus. 
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 The Port Huron Statement included an analysis of several social movements that 
had potential to challenge the assumptions of the Cold War as well as collapsed 
democracy.  In a section entitled “Alternatives to Helplessness,” the statement suggested 
that there was overlap between movements as disparate as the Peace Movement, 
organized labor, and Civil Rights.  Each movement was in need of a Democratic Party 
that actually represented their interests.  However, as SDS remarked in an earlier passage, 
“Political parties, even if realigned, would not provide adequate outlets for popular 
involvement.”40  Channeling Kaufman, who argued that participatory institutions should 
supplement the Democratic Party, SDS argued only through such movements as those 
listed above could “Mechanisms of voluntary association… be created through which 
political information can be imparted and political participation encouraged.”41  Even 
organized labor, which SDS argued was co-opted and ceased to be radical, still had the 
potential, as a participatory institution and bridge between movements, to challenge 
collapsed democracy.42 “[I]ts numbers and potential political strength, its natural interest 
in the abolition of exploitation, its reach to the grass roots of American society, combine 
to make it the best candidate for the synthesis of the civil rights, peace, and economic 
reform movements.”43  The need to unite various movements was crucial for SDS.  While 
organized labor had potential in this regard, student activists placed their faith in another 
institution.  
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 While independent publics challenged collapsed democracy, it would take a more 
inclusive, national response among the citizenry to create a participatory democracy.  The 
role of independent publics, which consisted of individuals realizing their potential 
through efforts in various types of social reform, was crucial because it served an 
educational and experimental function in society.  However, it would require the 
formation of what Dewey had termed a “great community” in order to correct the 
conceptual rift between government and governed, as well as the gap between active and 
inactive members of various publics.  Much as Dewey had argued in The Public and Its 
Problems (1927), SDS envisioned a society that challenged the traditional interpretation 
of the individual and the social, tearing down dualisms that created dogmatic views of 
individualism and social progress.  For the student activists, the university was the 
institution best poised to help create a great community. 
 By emphasizing the university as a center of social reform, SDS acknowledged 
the role of education in creating a great community.  The university’s purpose of 
instilling critical thought in the minds of its students would be an invaluable resource in a 
culture closed to dissent.  “Its educational function makes it indispensable and 
automatically makes it a crucial institution in the formation of social attitudes… in an 
unbelievably complicated world, it is the central institution for organizing, evaluating, 
and transmitting knowledge.”44   
The locations of various colleges and universities would allow students to cast a 
wide net across the United States, developing a number of equally distributed centers for 
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social change.  Also, as a “community of controversy”45 the university encouraged the 
political life to supplement formal learning, allowing “action to be informed by reason.”46  
Most important:  
The bridge to political power… will be built through genuine cooperation, locally, 
nationally, and internationally, between a new left of young people, and an 
awakening community of allies. In each community we must look within the 
university and act with confidence that we can be powerful, but we must look 
outwards to the less exotic but more lasting struggles for justice.47  
 
The university could provide a series of bridges, allowing the New Left to stitch together 
a larger, coherent community that would transcend and include a variety of critical 
publics.  The discussion of agency and social action would continue a year later in a 
sequel to The Port Huron Statement entitled America and the New Era. 
 
Conclusion:  A New Era  
 America and the New Era (1963) was a collaborative effort between Tom Hayden 
and Richard Flacks.  Much like The Port Huron Statement, the document was revised at a 
convention that was organized into small groups of editors.  Originally entitled 
“American Scene Document,”48 Hayden and Flacks hoped to use the article as a medium 
for analyzing “establishment liberalism” and a “new insurgency.”  According to Flacks, 
“The fundamental debate of the coming years… ought, then, to be between establishment 
liberalism and a new radicalism.  The defining characteristic of the latter positions will be 
the demand that immediate attention and full energy and resources be devoted to the 
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problems of this society.”49  The dismantling of the Cold War framework and the 
emergence of more vocal publics marked the beginning of a new era.  While a 
conservative-liberal politics sought to manage social conflict while avoiding real change, 
domestic as well as global disruptions weakened this position.  Coming back to 
Kaufman’s politics of radical pressure, SDS wrote, “As new constituencies are brought 
into political motion, as new voices are heard in the arena, as new centers of power are 
generated, existing institutions will begin to feel the pressures of change, and a new 
dynamic in national social and political life could come into being.”50 
 Many of the problems that defined the new era are familiar.  The majority of them 
appeared in The Port Huron Statement. Unemployment, tensions with labor, racism, 
poverty, misdistribution of power and resources, as well as an arms race and revolutions 
in the third world all helped create a climate where establishment liberalism could be 
challenged.  Each set of problems helped create vocal publics, a new insurgency, at the 
grassroots that would challenge national policy.  Following the statement, SDS’s second 
manifesto never mentioned abrupt or violent revolution.  The method for bringing about 
change is similar: 
The question is not whether radical changes will be needed, but how and by 
whom they will be carried out, and to whom the new society will be responsible.  
The overall strategic goal is not merely the solution of problems by making 
incremental changes in the present structure, but the development of a 
revolutionary trajectory which starts with tactical demands built on the most 
elementary felt human needs, and advances to a thorough change in social and 
economic structure.51    
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Once again, Kaufman’s influence is apparent.  The immediate needs on the local level 
created movements for change.  Instead of allowing a form of establishment liberalism to 
co-opt a movement for reform, a revolutionary trajectory would serve as an ultimate 
ideal—and motivating goal—that would provide a standard of measure for tracking the 
progress of tactical gains.  
The various social movements would culminate in an “insurgent politics.”52  The 
new insurgency challenged the Establishment through mass demonstrations, voter 
registration drives, and reform movements on a local and national level.  Taken as a form 
of coalition politics, the insurgency was a concept that originally appeared in The Port 
Huron Statement.  In the SDS schematic for social change, local publics would contribute 
to a common sentiment, one that resided outside the values associated with collapsed 
democracy, which would lead to the creation of participatory institutions that would 
augment any national decision-making process.  America and the New Era followed this 
line of argument:     
The agenda, then, is progressive, each step leading, hopefully, toward the society 
which is responsive to men’s vision, rather than men’s vision being limited by the 
conservative nature of society.  The key is that not merely a ‘list’ of liberal’s 
demands are pursued, but that all demands find their basis in human problems and 
human hopes, in dissatisfaction with the present state of human life and its socio-
economic institutions.53   
 
The existence of a great community and a democracy guided by participatory institutions 
would ensure that government was responsive to local and individual needs.  The process 
was not revolutionary in the Marxist sense of the term.  Absent is the language of class 
struggle.  According to Flacks, “we were talking about social movements, coalitions and 
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alignments, not classes.  The ‘labor metaphysic,’ that phrase, was constantly 
reverberating for us.  We didn’t want to be guilty of it.”54  Change would be gradual but 
defined by a trajectory that pointed toward a radical outcome—participatory democracy.
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION:  OF THEORETICAL TENSIONS IN THE MOVEMENT 
 
 According to James Miller the philosophical influences within SDS were 
diverse.  The emphasis on face-to-face politics could be attributed to a range of 
influences including Mills and, as a lesser-known example, Quaker communities that 
encouraged rule by consensus.1  Certain aspects of participatory democracy seem to have 
a nostalgic tinge, especially the vision of a local politics that is reminiscent of the town 
hall style meeting.  However, references to existentialism, Marxism, liberalism, Christian 
theology, and pragmatism are undeniable.  Miller argues that there is a pervading tension 
in much of Hayden’s as well as early activists’ thought between existentialist and Marxist 
ideas on the one hand, and those of the American pragmatists and civic-republicans on 
the other.   Of Hayden he writes, “[W]hen he follows Mills and his own teacher Arnold 
Kaufman, he depicts a world of orderly face-to-face discussion among responsible 
citizens; when he follows Camus and his own enthusiasm for the daring politics of direct 
action, he depicts a world of clashing wills and romantic heroes.”2  Among these 
competing ideas there seems to be little hope of reconciliation.  For Miller, these 
theoretical problems are never fully resolved. 
 Although both The Port Huron Statement and America and the New Era 
employed language that was steeped in existentialism as well as pragmatism, this does 
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not necessarily indicate the existence of an unresolved tension in the thought of SDS.  It 
would be hard to deny the relevance of Camus, especially in the various references to 
“authenticity” in these documents, but in many ways an existential politics of clashing 
wills does not contradict the tenets of participatory democracy.  The tension in these 
works was the result of a need to navigate the politics of a Marxist left as well as the 
liberal center in the United States.   
Along these lines, Dewey’s political theory functioned as a via media for 
Kaufman and early SDS members.  Participatory democracy denoted a method that 
would allow clashing wills, through shared experience, to form a great community.  The 
language of authenticity is not dissimilar to that of realized potential.  In both cases, an 
individual is able to creatively express desires and interests that are only realized in the 
collective action of a social reform movement. The idea that activists would remain in an 
ongoing state of revolt comes back to Dewey and Kaufman, who argued that society 
could never be perfected to a point beyond reform.  The romantic hero, who challenged 
an oppressor on his or her own, did not appear in Hayden’s “Letter to the New (Young) 
Left,” The Port Huron Statement, or America and the New Era.  What emerges out of the 
concept of participatory democracy is a vision of a pluralist society where individuals 
share in the decisions that affect their lives and collectively question final conclusions.  
The always present need to reconsider old ideas in light of new experiences would not 
create centrifugal forces that destroyed society.  Like Dewey, these activists stressed 
continuity as well as the importance of establishing tentative truths—ideas that are 
generally accepted among a “great community.”  Not only did the via media allow SDS-
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ers to navigate tension, it also provided a third and original option in regard to competing 
political theories. 
Participatory democracy and radical liberalism were ideas that fell outside of 
liberal and Marxist political traditions.  Considered in that light, Dewey’s political 
philosophy should not be taken as a compromise between liberalism and Marxism, one 
that combined the best elements of each to produce a remarkable hybrid.  While Dewey 
championed the liberal ideal of democracy as well as greater equality, an aspect of 
Marxism, he was generally suspicious of any closed political theory.  As with the New 
Left later, the via media yielded a unique and original method for understanding political 
theory.   
Radical liberalism and participatory democracy were both outcomes of the 
application of Dewey’s philosophical method to the realm of political and social theory.  
Radical epistemology, contingency, pluralism, and experimentalism are all unique 
elements that served as the foundation for Dewey’s brand of radical liberalism.  The 
resulting tradition was original in the sense that it stressed method over theory, 
contingency over truth, and pluralism over any kind of teleology or fixed model of the 
state and its relationship to the individual.  Ideas and historical circumstances would 
always change, meaning a political theory could never purport to always provide the best 
model for social organization.  As a via media for Dewey, and the New Left later, radical 
liberalism and participatory democracy developed as methods that directly challenged 
both liberalism and Marxism.  
In pointing toward a via media for Dewey and the New Left, it is also important 
to recognize how the conditions that marked the period in which Dewey was working 
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were very similar to those of Kaufman and SDS in the early sixties.  Dewey was a critic 
of Progressive Era reforms, Marxism, and the Welfare State because each of those 
traditions, according to him, denied the relevance of participatory institutions and greater 
social experimentation in establishing a just social order.  As New Leftists would later 
argue, he suggested the New Deal turned average Americans into consumers of 
government aid, not producers of policies that would improve their lives.  Not only did 
Kaufman and SDS draw from this critique, they applied similar language to their 
respective analyses of the War On Poverty and political realism.  The Welfare State 
would never be satisfying for these activists because it resisted direct action among the 
general population and established a bond between the federal government and business 
elites – a concern that Dewey had expressed decades earlier.   
 Although Dewey’s thought appeared relevant to Kaufman and SDS as they found 
themselves addressing similar political and social problems in the early sixties, it is 
necessary to acknowledge the New Left’s turn toward violence and rejection of radical 
liberalism.  As discussed above3 in relation to Kaufman’s criticism of SDS, the 
movement became increasingly suspicious of democratic reform.  For SDS-ers, the 
democratic process had the potential to co-opt radical movements, a charge the New Left 
would level against the reforms of Johnson’s Great Society.  Further, the escalation of 
violence in Vietnam despite the work of the peace movement seemed to indicate that a 
combination of coalition politics and grass-roots organizing could not seriously challenge 
the Cold War consensus that defined foreign policy.  As Kaufman commented, SDS 
detached the concept of participatory democracy from its roots in radical liberalism.  
Many members of SDS believed politicians simply sacrificed ideals for immediate, 
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piecemeal legislative gains – limited reforms that did not seriously challenge the status 
quo.  These activists championed a vision of participatory democracy that immediately 
placed political power in the hands of the masses.  According to this perspective, 
contingency and pluralism would have been elements of a corruptible political theory.
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